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THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO
MANDATORY RETIREMENT STATUTES
"How dull it is to pause, to make an end,
To rust unburnished, not to shine in use!"
-TENNYSON, Ulysses
INTRODUCION
In December of 1972, after having worked for nearly four years as
medical-records transcriber for Douglas County, Nebraska, Loretta
Armstrong was informed that her employment was being discontinued.
Her ability was unquestioned. Unfortunately, a recently enacted man-
datory retirement policy with an upper limit of age 65 required her
termination. Ms. Armstrong was then one month short of her seven-
tieth birthday. Defending the validity of the regulation in the federal
district court, the Douglas County attorney argued:
Age is a condition which goes to the ability of a person to perform
work or services. Loretta Armstrong was not retired because of her
assertion of any First Amendment right, or because she was the
member of a minority group. She belongs to a class of persons
reasonably labeled as generally unsuitable to employers.1
The court, in Armstrong v. Howell,2 sustained the retirement
provision holding that it was reasonably related to the permissible
governmental goals of achieving equal employment opportunities for
all citizens and promoting economy and efficiency in such employment.
Under the rationale of Armstrong, a governmental employer can
safely promote youth at the expense of the aged regardless of individual
capacity since advanced age (65 and over) brings with it an apparently
unquestionable decrement in work efficiency. 8
Until recently, those who disagreed with mandatory retirement
suffered silently. The few challenges that were brought produced dis-
1 Brief for Defendant at 18, Armstrong v. Howell, 371 F. Supp. 48 (D. Neb. 1974)
(mem.).
2 371 F. Supp. 48 (D. Neb. 1974) (mem.).
3 The Armstrong court cited with approval the statement of Judge Tyler in Weiss v.
Walsh, 324 F. Supp. 75, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 461 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973): "Notwithstanding great advances in gerontology, the era
when advanced age ceases to bear some reasonable statistical relationship to diminished
capacity or longevity is still future." 371 F. Supp. at 52. See note 85 infra. Nevertheless,
neither the court in Weiss nor that in Armstrong cited any evidence supporting the
existence of this age-related decrement. In both cases the courts conceded that the
complainants were fully qualified.
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couraging results.4 These decisions often emphasized that it was the
legislative prerogative to determine at which point the ravages of time
render the skills of a class of employees obsolete or inefficient.5 Never-
theless, the state has seldom come forward with evidence more concrete
than the generally accepted notion that personnel over a certain age
detract from the vigor of the work force.6
Although several suits filed in the federal courts have attempted
to force states to empirically demonstrate the assumed deficiencies of
older workers,7 the Supreme Court recently dismissed the appeal of
one such case, Mcllvaine v. Pennsylvania,8 for want of a substantial
4 See Fabio v. St. Paul, 267 Minn. 273, 126 N.W.2d 259 (1964) (police officer retired
at age 65); Ehrlich v. Public Employees' Retirement Sys., 42 N.J. Super. 419, 126 A.2d
673 (1956) (borough clerk retired at age 70); Browning v. Seattle, 50 Wash. 2d 813, 314 P.2d
648 (1957) (city employee retired at age 67).
In Boyle v. Philadelphia, 338 Pa. 129, 12 A.2d 43 (1940), the hosemen and laddermen
of the Fire Bureau and the patrolmen of the Police Department questioned the city
council's right to classify them as second-class at age 60 and to compulsory retire them
at age 65. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania responded:
To ask the question is to answer it. ... While there are some individual excep-
tions, it is undoubted that the man of sixty is not as physically able to perform
exhausting duties as is a younger man. Certainly, it is also true that he has
developed a mental attitude of caution to danger that would be disregarded by
one more youthful. Acts of strength, endurance, and bravery are not usually
performed by men of three score years. They are generally physically incapable
of such action.
Id. at 131, 12 A.2d at 44.
5 E.g., Fabio v. St. Paul, 267 Minn. 273, 276, 126 N.W.2d 259, 262 (1964).
6 See, eg., Murgia v. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass.
1974), prob. furis. noted, 95 S. Ct. 1973 (1975). In Murgia, a three-judge federal court
ruled that the Massachusetts statute which compelled the retirement of state police at
age 50 was unconstitutional. The court refused to assume that "early retirement enhances
the morale of younger members"; rather, it found that it "merely advances the time of
ultimate unhappiness." Id. at 754 (footnote omitted). More importantly, the Murgia
court would not accept the bald assertion that retirement at age 50 is rationally related
to maintaining a vigorous police force, but required the state to document the presumed
debilities of the 50 and over age group. The state was unable to produce a study of
any kind. The little data it had revealed- statistics on discharges which were unrelated
to injury- showed more losses in the 40-44 age group than in the older 45-49 category.
376 F. Supp. at 756. Absent a demonstrable rational basis for its classification, the court
had no reasonable alternative but to find the policy in conflict with the equal protection
requirements of the fourteenth amendment. See generally note 69 and accompanying text
infra.
Age 50 is a far cry from the traditional retirement age of 65 or 70. In fact, the court
in Murgia stated that the outcome might well have been different had a more usual age
limit been involved. Id. n.9. The import of Murgia for present consideration, however,
is that the state was required to produce evidence supportive of its mandatory retirement
age.
7 Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1122 (1975), discussed in notes 137-49 and accompanying text infra; Murgia v. Massa-
chusetts Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass. 1974) (three-judge court), prob.
juris. noted, 95 S. Ct. 1973 (1975), discussed in note 6 supra.
8415 U.S. 986 (1974), dismissing appeal from 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973), aff'g
6 Pa. Commw. 505, 296 A.2d 630 (1972) (mandatory retirement of police officer at age 60
upheld).
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federal question. This dismissal has been interpreted by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit as a decision by the Supreme Court on
the merits upholding the mandatory retirement of governmental em-
ployees and thereby foreclosing further constitutional challenges.,
Moreover, a three-judge court in the District of Columbia similarly
interpreted the Supreme Court's disposition of Mcllvaine, and on ap-
peal, this decision was itself summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court.1'
Despite the fact that such dismissals, along with summary affirmances,
are frequently referred to as decisions on their merits,:" their prece-
dential value is limited, especially where the decision in the lower court
either omitted or inadequately treated important constitutional issues.'2
9 Rubino v. Ghezzi, 512 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam), petition for cert. filed,
44 U.S.L.W. 3012 (U.S. May 22, 1975) (No. 74-1468). In Rubino, the court affirmed the
district court's refusal to convene a three-judge court to hear a challenge to the state's
mandatory retirement of elected inferior court judges at age 70. The Second Circuit
panel reasoned that the state's interest in judicial efficiency and in encouraging younger
attorneys with judicial aspirations provided a rational basis for the requirement and that
arguments that it contravened equal protection and due process of law were dearly
insubstantial in view of Mcllvaine. Id. at 433-34. See also Aronstam v. Cashman, 132 Vt.
538, 325 A.2d 361 (1974) (mandatory retirement of elected state judges upheld).
10 Weisbrod v. Lynn, 383 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974) (mem.) (three-judge court), aff'd
mem., 420 U.S. 940 (1975). In this case a federal civil servant sought a declaratory judg-
ment that the Federal Employee Mandatory Retirement Law, 5 U.S.C. § 8335 (1970), was
unconstitutional. In the initial unreported decision, the district court dismissed plain-
tiff's request to convene a three-judge court as well as the action itself on the ground that
the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court of
appeals reversed, finding ample indication that the case warranted consideration by a
three-judge court. Weisbrod v. Lynn, 494 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam). Shortly
thereafter, however, the McIlvaine appeal was dismissed. In light thereof, the District of
Columbia three-judge court- convened pursuant to the appellate court's decision-
dismissed Weisbrod's complaint, holding that the Supreme Court's dismissal of Mcllvaine
was dispositive of the issues raised therein. The court rejected plaintiff's attempts to
distinguish McIlvaine on the ground that higher physical stamina was required of police
than of legal services employees. It found such reasoning to be pure speculation and
concluded that the Mcrlvaine court was fully aware of the controlling constitutional issues
in the mandatory retirement controversy so as to render the case at bar substantially
similar, if not identical, to it. 383 F. Supp. at 936-37.
".1Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959) (per curiam) (Brennan, J.). "Votes
to affirm summarily, and to dismiss for want of a substantial federal question, it hardly
needs comment, are votes on the merits of a case .... " Id. at 247. Accord, Port Auth.
Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 387 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1967).
Compare id. with Rios v. Dillman, 499 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1974).
12 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974), discussed in notes 25-30 and
accompanying text infra. In Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1972), a paroled
convicted felon challenged, a Washington statute disenfranchising persons convicted of
crimes punishable by imprisonment in the State penitentiary. In requesting the convening
of a three-judge court the plaintiff argued that the statute violated the equal protection
dause insofar as the offenses which might subject one to imprisonment in the State
penitentiary bore no rational relation to the need for disenfranchisement. For example,
offenses such as dueling, adultery, and bigamy carried a prison sentence, yet a wide
variety of offenses directly related to the electoral process did not result in disenfran-
chisement since no prison sentence attended them. Rather than counter the plaintiff's
arguments, the State relied on the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of a three-judge
[Vol. 49:7489
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In McIlvaine, a state police captain of conceded ability was, pur-
suant to the state administrative code, forced into retirement the day
following his 60th birthday. He subsequently brought a mandamus
action in the Pennsylvania courts asking for reinstatement. The captain
alleged that: (1) the administrative code provision violated the state
constitution's prohibition of discrimination against the exercise of civil
Tights; 13 (2) the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act specifically stated
that the opportunity to obtain employment for which one is qualified
constitutes a civil right which may not be infringed upon by age dis-
-crimination;14 and, (3) the statute mandating his retirement was vio-
lative of his rights under the fourteenth amendment of the Federal
Constitution.
The commonwealth court, in a decision affirmed by a divided
Pennsylvania Supreme Court,15 held that termination of employment
by reason of age when applied uniformly to the selected class was not
discrimination within the meaning of the Human Relations Act.', In
addition, the court noted that the Act excepts from its coverage bona
fide occupational qualifications and the plaintiff presented no proof,
beyond his own continued ability, that mandatory retirement at age
,60 was not a bona fide exception. 17 Turning to the fourteenth amend-
ment issues, the court completely omitted discussion of the equal pro-
tection and due process clauses because the plaintiff's sole support under
this heading was the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act.'8
decision upholding a Florida statute similar to the one sub judice.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held for the plaintiff and ordered the
convening of a three-judge court on two grounds. First, it noted that the three-judge court
in Florida had given the equal protection argument only cursory treatment. Second, the
court stated that "[a] summary affirmance without opinion in a case within the Supreme
Court's obligatory appellate jurisdiction has very little precedential significance." Id. at
1225, citing Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term
1929, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1, 14 (1930).
13 See PA. CONsr. art. 1, § 26, wherein it is provided that "neither the Commonwealth
nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of any
civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right."
14 See Act of Oct. 27, 1955, Pub. L. No. 222, § 3, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 953 (Supp. 1974). This Act provides:
The opportunity for an individual to obtain employment for which he is quali-
fied, and to obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges
of any place of public accommodation and of commercial housing without dis-
crimination because of race, color, religious creed, ancestry, handicap or dis-
ability, age, sex or national origin are hereby recognized as and declared to be
civil rights which shall be enforceable as set forth in this act.
15 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973). After discussing the applicability of the mandamus
statute to the instant case, four of the six justices summarily affirmed the decision of the
<ourt below upholding the challenged provision of the administrative code. Justice
Roberts, joined by Justice Nix, dissented.
16 6 Pa. Commw. at 511, 296 A.2d at 633.
17 Id. at 512, 296 A.2d at 633.
1829 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (1970). See notes 55-63 and accompanying text infra.
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Since this statute, like the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, recog-
nizes bona fide occupational qualifications, the court found the plain-
tiff's lack of proof to be as fatal under the federal statute as it had
been under that of the state.19
Mcllvaine need not prevent further consideration of the merits of
mandatory retirement legislation since the case fails to consider the abil-
ities and circumstances of the aged as a class; overlooks the equal pro-
tection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment; and
finally, appears to invite further challenges by parties who can present
data more persuasive than his or her own continued work capacity.
Yet, even if Mcllvaine is construed as having considered all pertinent
issues,20 a controversy still exists over the weight attributable to an ap-
peal dismissed by the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, for example, gives such summary decisions little prece-
1 6 Pa. Commw. at 511-12, 296 A.2d at 633-34. Justice Roberts, in his dissenting opin-
ion in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court argued that the lower court had erroneously put
the burden of establishing the lack of a bona fide occupational exception on the plaintiff.
He noted that under § 954(b) of the Human Relations Act the Commonwealth is to be
treated as any other "employer" and under controlling Pennsylvania law the employer,
not the complaining employee, must prove the facts establishing the exception. 454 Pa.
at 138, 809 A.2d at 806.
In addition, Justice Roberts found the mandatory retirement statute violative of the
equal protection clause. He adopted the equal protection test propounded by Justice
Powell in Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). This test, interpreted by
Justice Roberts as a step toward the "sliding scale" approach, 454 Pa. at 146, 809 A.2d
at 810, requires a dual inquiry: "What legitimate state interest does the, classification
promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification endanger?" 406 U.S.
at 173. Applying this standard to the case at bar, Justice Roberts found the state's only
proffered interest- administrative convenience - could not justify age-based termination
where there was no showing whatsoever that age significantly related to McIlvaine's
performance. He argued that: "This record demonstrates that appellant has, through the
mechanistic application of this discriminatory statute, been denied an equal opportunity
to continue in his chosen profession -one for which he is admittedly eminently qualified."
454 Pa. at 148, 309 A .2d at 811.
20 The three-judge court in Weisbrod v. Lynn, 385 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974) (mem.),
aff'd mem., 420 U.S. 940 (1975), felt that the "aged as a suspect class" argument, see text
accompanying notes 79-110 infra, was before the Court in Mcllvaine because it was treated
in Justice Roberts' dissent in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 383 F. Supp. at 936 n.6.
Actually, Justice Roberts never mentioned this theory, rather he pointed out that[i]t has been further suggested that classifications having a differential impact on
particular income groups should be added to the circle of cases in which the
reviewing court will require a "compelling state interest" in order to justify the
classification.
454 Pa. at 141-42, 309 A.2d at 808 (footnote omitted). Yet, since Weisbrod squarely raised
the issue, and on appeal the decision was summarily affirmed, 420 U.S. 940 (1975), an
argument can be made that any points missed in McIlvaine were disposed of on the
merits by the Weisbrod affirmance. Inasmuch as neither the district court nor the Supreme
Court in Weisbrod delved further than the pleadings, however, it is submitted that the
precedential value of Weisbrod is minimal. This view is confirmed by the Supreme Court's
holding in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), wherein the Court noted that both
summary affirmances and full opinions which do not substantively treat an issue passed
on below are of some precedential value despite the Court's lack of discussion, but that
such affirmances are not of the same value as opinions passing on the merits. Id. at 670-71.
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dential value,21 whereas that of the Second Circuit views them as bind-
ing on the merits.22 In addition, a recent Supreme Court holding 3
reveals the potential error in a lower court's allowing either a summary
affirmance or a dismissal of an appeal to take the place of an inde-
pendent determination of the constitutional issues presented.2 A
In Edelman v. Jordan,25 the Court faced the question of whether
the eleventh amendment, regarding federal jurisdiction over actions
commenced against the states, prohibited federal courts from ordering
state governments to make retroactive welfare payments to recipients
whose benefits had been wrongfully withheld. Several three-judge court
decisions, summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court as recently as
1972, had issued such orders despite the eleventh amendment argu-
ments of the affected states.26 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, whose decision was before the Court in Edelman,27 relying on
these precedents and on the maxim that a summary affirmance is a
21 Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1972).
22 Port Auth. Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 387 F.2d 259, 262
(2d Cir. 1967).
23Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
24 In Rubino v. Ghezzi, 512 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam), petition for cert.
filed, 44 U.SI..vV. 3012 (U.S. May 22, 1975) (No. 74-1468), see note 9 supra, the court
refused to convene a three-judge district court to test the constitutionality of the state's
mandatory retirement of elected civil court judges at age 70. In so holding, the Second
Circuit panel stated, "[t]he claim that the mandatory retirement age violates the due
process and equal protection clauses is, we believe, clearly insubstantial in view of the
holding of the Supreme Court in Mcllvaine .... " Id. at 433. It is submitted that in so
ruling the court erred. In Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973), the Court, after stating
that a three-judge court need not be convened when the constitutional attack upon the
state statute is essentially frivolous or obviously without merit, proceeded to define these
terms.
The limiting words "wholly" and "obviously" have cogent legal significance.
In the context of the effect of prior decisions upon the substantiality of con-
stitutional claims, those words import that claims are constitutionally insub-
stantial only if the prior decisions inescapably render the claims frivolous;
previous decisions that merely render claims of doubtful or questionable merit
do not render them insubstantial for the purposes of . . . [convening a three-
judge court to challenge a state statute].
Id. at 518. The language in Goosby would appear to indicate that there is little justi-
fication for the Second Circuit's view that Mcllvaine is dispositive of an issue of first
impression in the Supreme Court. This is so since in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974), the Court found that summary affirmances are not equivalent to opinions treating
the issues on the merits.
25 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
26 Sterrett v. Mothers 9- Childrens Rights Org., Civil No. 71-932 (N.D. InI., April 14,
1972) (three-judge court), aff'd, 409 U.S. 809 (1972); Zarate v. State Dep't of Health &
Rehab. Servs., 347 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (three-judge court), aff'd, 407 U.S. 918
(1972). Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), afg 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967)
(three-judge court). In Shapiro, the lower court had similarly ruled that orders command-
ing the states to make back welfare payments are not violative of the eleventh amendment.
270 F. Supp. at 338 n.5. The Supreme Court's affirmance, however, did not treat this issue.
27 Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973), revtd sub nom. Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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decision on the merits, concluded that "the aforementioned Supreme
Court affirmances foreclose the sovereign immunity or Eleventh
Amendment argument defendants press here."28
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehn-
quist explained that summary affirmances, although of precedential
value, are not equivalent to an opinion treating the issue on its merits.29
Furthermore, the Court noted that when constitutional questions are
involved, the doctrine of stare decisis is less constraining. 0 In light of
this reasoning, it is submitted that the issue of mandatory retirement
be resolved, not by rigid adherence to a precedent of doubtful valid-
ity,81 but rather, by the thorough consideration recommended by
Justice Field over 80 years ago:
It is more important that the court should be right upon later and
more elaborate consideration of the cases than consistent with pre-
vious declarations. Those doctrines only will eventually stand
which bear the strictest examination and the test of experience.32
In accordance with the observation of Justice Field, this Note will
examine many studies conducted during the last thirty years which have
28 472 F.2d at 989-90.
29 This case, therefore, is the first opportunity the Court has taken to fully explore
and treat the Eleventh Amendment aspects of such relief in a written opinion.
Shapiro v. Thompson and these three summary affirmances [see note 26 supra]
obviously are of precedential value in support of the contention that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar the relief awarded by the District Court in this case.
Equally obviously, they are not of the same precedential value as would be an
opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits.
415 U.S. at 670-71.
30 "[I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legisla-
tive action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier deci-
sions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reason-
ing, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical
sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function."
Id. at 671 n.14, quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
31 In addition to Edelman's indication that summary decisions do not settle constitu-
tional issues with the requisite finality so as to render their further adjudication
"frivolous," the Second Circuit itself in Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973), found not controlling two summary aflirmances by the
Supreme Court of lower court decisions upholding the constitutionality of federal court
orders directing states to make retroactive welfare payments to wrongfully deprived
recipients.
For the most part, appellees have been content to defend the District Court's
award of retroactive payments by the assertion that other federal courts have done
so and that their judgments on appeal to the Supreme Court have been affirmed.
It certainly is true that relief of this kind has been given in other cases. We do not
find, however, that the Supreme Court has as yet addressed itself specifically and
authoritatively to this issue.
467 F.2d at 239. See also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
s2 Barden v. Northern Pac. R.R., 154 U.S. 288, 822 (1894). Cf. Gendron v. Saxbe, 501
F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1974), appeal docketed sub nom. Gendron v. Levi, 44 U.S.L.W. B011
(U.S. Apr. 21, 1975) (No. 74-1324) (prior decisions of the Supreme Court directed to con-
[Vol. 49:748
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addressed the question of whether older workers exhibit a measurable
deterioration in employment capacity. The results of these studies will
be further scrutinized against the backdrop of the psychological effects
of mandatory retirement and present federal age discrimination laws.
Ultimately, this Note will attempt to demonstrate that compulsory
retirement, where state action can be shown, violates both the equal
protection and due process rights of the aged.3 3 It is hoped that the
arguments presented herein will be given careful consideration by
courts and legislatures in their respective determinations as to whether
existing age-based retirement statutes should be perpetuated.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF RETIREMENT
Low retirement benefits,3 4 illness, death of a spouse, and inflation
- both individually and in combination- burden the lives of senior
,citizens. Nevertheless, the descent into the abyss of "old age" is for
-many, if not most, people associated with work status and chronological
age.3 5 Mandatory retirement of the older worker not only deprives him
stitutional issues different from those raised in the subsequent action do not render the
new issues constitutionally insubstantial).
33 See generally Note, Too Old to Work: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Retire-
ment Plans, 44 So. CAL. L. REv. 150 (1971).
34 The Senate Special Committee on Aging reported in 1973 that "[p]ersons involun-
-tarily retired frequently experienced a sharp reduction in income. Annuities for those
-involuntarily retired typically replaced less than one-half of their prior Government
-salary." SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING: 1972 AND JANUARY-MARCH
1973, S. REP. No. 147, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL COMM.
REPORT]. The Senate Committee noted that the Bureau of Labor Statistics Intermediate
Budget, "estimated at $5,200 for elderly couples and $2,860 for single persons," was
"beyond the means of most older Americans." Id. at 15. Even this modest Intermediate
Budget appears affluent when compared to the plight of 300,000 elderly New York City
residents, 30% of the City's aged population, who must exist on incomes of $2,800 for
couples and $2,100 or less for a single person. See Carmody, Lunch Programs Feed Mind
.and Body of Elderly, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1974, at 33, col. 1. The high incidence of
poverty among the aged is not caused by the already poor growing older. Rather, as Dr.
Robert N. Butler writes, "[m]ost poor elderly grew poor after growing old. The American
median income of some $10,000 per year is halved by the 'blessings' of retirement for
which the elderly are ill prepared." Butler, How to Grow Old and Poor in an Affluent
Society, 4 INTr'L J. AGING AND HtrMAN Dxv. 277 (1973). Under the new Supplemental
Security Income, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (Supp. III 1973), the maximum entitlement avail-
able to a single elderly person is $1,752. Id. § 1382(b)(1). For an eligible couple the
maximum entitlement is $2,628. Id. § 1382(b)(2).
35 See Atchley & George, Symptomatic Measurement of Age, 13 GERONrOLOGIST 332, 334
.(1973) [hereinafter cited as Atchley & George]. But see Peters, Self-Conceptions of the Aged,
Age Identification, and Aging, 11 GFmtoTOLOGIsr 69 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Peters].
Peters suggests that chronological age bears only a slight relationship to age-identification.
Id. at 72.
Research has indicated that a significant number of the elderly identify themselves as
members of the "working" class. Imbued with the work ethic, many find little satisfaction
in devoting themselves to hobbies or other forms of leisure activity. In a study of 483
retired male company workers, only 36% of those who had made no retirement plans
,were found well adjusted to their status. Among those who had made such plans, only
1975]
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of income but also, within the passage of a day, transports him to what
has been described as a "class of persons reasonably labeled as generally
unsuitable to employers."36 The psychological impact of compulsory
retirement, although difficult to quantify, cannot, it is suggested, be
overlooked.3 7
A number of studies agree that a person's self-conception is
diminished, not because of any actual physiological changes occurring
with advanced chronological age, but rather, because of the roles, refer-
ences, norms, and stereotypes imposed on the aged by society.88 Research
a slightly higher percentage was well adjusted. The data revealed that keeping busy and
involvement in hobbies were minor factors in gaining satisfaction. In fact, of those
most pleased with retirement, only 5% spent a significant amount of time on a hobby.
See M. BARRON, THE AGING AMERICAN 73 (1961) [hereinafter cited as BARRON].
But reluctance to join the leisure class is not restricted to the traditional working
class employee. The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, meeting in
August, 1974, by voice vote decided "not to amend its by-laws to limit the age of its
members to 70 years and, by a [nearly 2 to 1] vote .... determined not to deprive certain
past officers of the association from lifetime membership in the House." 3 ABA GENERAL
PRAcIIca SEarION 1 (1974). Likewise, psychiatrists have expressed little desire to enter
retirement. See Cyrus-Lutz & Gaitz, Psychiatrists' Attitudes Toward the Aged and Aging,
12 GEROrOLOGISr 163 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Cyrus-Lutz & Gaitz].
36 Brief for Defendant at 18, Armstrong v. Howell, 371 F. Supp. 48 (D. Neb. 1974)
(mem.). See text accompanying note 1 supra.
37 (M]any people have such great difficulty psychologically in dealing with their
retirement. Many never seem to work their problems out; they fall into deeper
and deeper stages of depression; family relationships become more complicated;
and frustration leads to loneliness and withdrawal. When this happens, society is
left with a mental cripple ....
Statement of William I. Mitchell, retirement consultant to the American Association of
Retired Persons, Hearings on Retirement and the Individual Before the Subcomm. on
Retirement and the Individual of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 166 (1967). This observation confirms the theoretical speculation that:
The abrupt termination of one's active interests and occupation, unless carefully
handled, can have disastrous personal effects. Unemployment aggravates existing
neuroses and tends to reactivate dormant ones .... The retired worker, business-
man, professional man, or homemaker misses the externally imposed routine. He
loses his familiar landmarks, his points of reference, and with them his sense of
personal identity . . . . The experience of being all at once unnecessary and
unwanted, with the deprivation of incentive and of an opportunity to continue
one's accustomed work, may precipitate restlessness, weariness, and dejection that
lead over into hypochondria, chronic fatigue states, or neurotic depression with
resentment and self-depreciation.
Cameron, Neuroses of Later Maturity, in MErNrAL DisoRDERs IN LATER LIF 201, 219 (2d ed.
0. Kaplan, 1956) (footnotes omitted).
38 See, e.g., Peters, supra note 35, at 70-72. Barron has analyzed eight of the most
common reasons given by employers for retiring or refusing to hire older workers:
1. Older workers are less productive. But such facts as are available do not bear
this out. Surveys generally show that the quantity and quality of work by older
workers are equal to or superior to those of younger employees.
2. They are frequently absent. Yet a 1956 survey by the United States Labor
Department showed that older workers had an attendance record 20 percent
better than that of younger workers.
3. They are involved in more accidents. Yet the same survey by the Labor De-
partment showed that workers forty-five years of age and over had 2.5 per cent
fewer disabling injuries and 25 per cent fewer non-disabling injuries than those
under forty-five.
4. They do not stay on the payroll long enough to justify hiring expenses. Yet
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conducted by Atchley and George, based on questionnaires returned by
3,510 older adults, indicates that age identification is not so much
correlated with the physical and psychological decrements assumed to
accompany old age as it is with changes in work status and other roles
which vary according to age.80 For the men studied, retirement seemed
to be the central factor in age identification. The inference to be drawn
from this study is that the older person develops his age identification
not from an awareness of his own decreasing mental and physical
abilities, but rather from social assignments determined by chrono-
logical age.40
Sociologist Dr. George R. Peters of Kansas State University has
noted that in recognizing changes in themselves and in perceiving that
the attitudes of others towards them have been altered, older people are
less influenced by chronological age than they are by age identifica-
tion.41 He finds that society's views on aging and the elderly are
paralleled by the self-images possessed by the aged.42 Notably, other
studies show that society stereotypes old age as a period of decreasing
activity, loneliness, economic insecurity, and diminished physical and
mental ability.43 Studies dating back to 1953 have compared the status
studies show that separation rates for older workers are much lower than for
younger employees.
5. It is too costly to provide them with adequate pensions. But this is an easy
generalization that is rarely based on a careful scrutiny of the company pension
plan to see just what the impact of hiring the worker will be. It often depends on
the type of plan.
6. Older workers cause major increases in employee group insurance costs. But
here again the costs all depend on the nature of the plan.
7. They do not have needed job skills. However, on the contrary, the facts show
that the older worker is likely to possess more skills, training, and know-how
than younger job hunters.
8. They are inflexible and unimaginative and have trouble getting along with
younger workers. It is hard to imagine a generalization more susceptible to
contradiction by the individual case than this one. The practical experience of
many companies indicates that this factor is seriously overrated.
BARON, supra note 85, at 61. See also Note, Age Discrimination in Employment:
Correcting a Constitutionally Infirm Legislative Judgment, 47 S. CAL. L. R1v. 1811, 1324
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Infirm Legislative Judgment].
38 Atchley & George, supra note 85, at 834.
40 The deprivation of role models for the aged in the media is noted in Francher,
"It's the Pepsi Generation . . . " Accelerated Aging and the Television Commercial, 4
INT'L J. AGING AND Hut AN DEV. 245 (1973). Dr. James E. Bitten recognized over ten years
ago that the interaction among social, sociological, and physiological factors was much
greater than previously realized. J. BuumN, Tm PsY cHOLOGY OF AGING 218 (1964) [herein-
after cited as BIRN].
41 See Peters, supra note 85, at 72.
42 Id. at 73.
43 See Kuypers & Bengston, Social Breakdown and Competence, 16 HUMAN DEv. 181,
189-90 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Kuypers & Bengston]; notes 46-47 and accompanying
text infra. Barron views society's attitudes toward aging as a significant catalyst in what he
describes as the "potentially morbid consequences of retirement."
The theoretical ideas of Mead, Waller, Cottrell, and other leading social psy-
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of the elderly to that of minority groups.44 A 1968 study dealing with
the attitudes of medical students found prejudice against the aged even
stronger than that against blacks.45
Kuypers and Bengston argue that the elderly in our society are
dependent on external labeling due to both role loss which occurs as a
result of leaving the work force and other consequences of social re-
organization in later life.46 The result of this dependence is, in their
opinion, internalization of the typically negative characteristics at-
tributed to age.47 If one accepts the premise that society has a negative
attitude toward the aged, it is then possible to establish a causal relation
between this social stigmatization and mandatory retirement. This
might be done by focusing on the involuntary nature of the retirement,
viewing it as the first stage in a cycle whereby society increasingly
deprives the older person of his decision making autonomy. Dr.
Frederick C. Swartz, Chairman of the American Medical Association's
Committee on Aging, however, finds more subtle objections to manda-
tory retirement:
At first, this problem may not seem to have any medical aspects,
but it does when you realize that retired men live an average of
only two and one-half years after separation from their jobs and
chologists jointly stress that the individual personality may fruitfully be viewed as
a "social self"; it internalizes in the course of its development not only society's
or the group's normal attitudes but also the group's confusions and frustrations.
Society's tensions and cultural inconsistencies contribute to the conditioning of
the self. When the self is mentally and emotionally disordered as well as physically
ill, the family, the neighborhood, or society itself may be the cause.
BARRON, supra note 35, at 82 (footnote omitted).
44 Barron, Minority Group Characteristics of the Aged in American Society, 8 J.
GERONTOLOGY 477 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Minority Group Characteristics]. The author
found that the existence of erroneous stereotypes concerning the aged worker; the bitter-
ness, resentment, and self-hatred of older workers experiencing age discrimination; and
the then incipient movement to legislate against age discrimination created enough
parallels with ethnic minorities to justify dealing with the aged as a "quasi-minority."
45 Spence & Feigenbaum, Medical Student Attitudes Toward the Geriatric Patient, 16
J. GF-RoTrroLoY 976 (1968). The test involved the hypothetical situation of having to save
one of two patients. When race was a factor, 50% of the students refused to choose whom
to save; but when age was a factor, only 5% refused to choose.
46 See Kuypers & Bengston, supra note 43.
47 Comparing social labeling of the elderly with that of the mentally ill, Kuypers and
Bengston write:
While the specific quality of social labeling of a mentally ill person and an
elderly person are different, for both there is an emphasis on the negative quality
of the cues. The elderly have the additional disadvantage of having vague or ill-
defined labels. That is, negatively-toned stereotypes associated with loss of 'pro-
ductive' roles may become accepted by the individual in describing himself.
From the dominant functionalistic perspective of Western society, the elderly
person is informed- directly and indirectly -of his uselessness, obsolescence,
low value, inadequacy, and incompetence.
Id. at 189.
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that the suicide rate in men past 65 is higher than in any other
age group. In addition to these stark facts, the nonworker soon
becomes a medical problem with most of the real or imaginary
symptoms the flesh is heir to.48
In contrast, one of the nation's leading authorities on aging, Dr.
Jack Botwinick, has recently questioned the wisdom of opposing man-
datory retirement.49 He claims that favoring a policy of voluntary retire-
ment assumes that people will be happier, that the economy will support
both young and old workers, and that it is possible to assess work ability
with a minimum of difficulty. He continues:
[A] point must come in the lives of most people, if not all, when
ability will decline to a point where it is difficult to carry out
job responsibilities. Would it not be more painful, more damaging
to self-concept, to be retired on this basis rather than on the arbi-
trary one of age?50
As an alternative, he recommends increased preparation for retirement.
Unfortunately, there are now very few high quality programs of this.
type available.51 Studies have shown that younger members of the work
force never expect to lose their productivity. Such evasion of the subject
of aging has even been observed in psychiatrists. When asked about
personal feelings regarding their own aging, a significant number re-
sponded that they hoped to work up to the moment of death or to die
quickly. 2 Thus, even if there were adequate compensation and prepara-
tion available to the prospective retiree, it is doubtful, given the present
attitude toward aging, that today's older worker would enthusiastically
embrace the type of program envisioned by Dr. Botwinick.
48 Swartz, Aging Redefined, or the Ravages of Time Debunked, 27 GERIATRIcs, Dec.,
1972, at 26, 30.
49 J. BOTWINIcK, AGING AND BEHAVIOR 64 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BorwINICK].
80 Id. Instead of struggling to keep people in the work force, Dr. Botwinick feels it is
preferable to train them for leisure pursuits and to readjust personal and societal values
with respect to work and leisure. See id.
51 See Schwartz, Retirement: Termination or Transition, 29 GEaRAnucs, May, 1974,
at 190, 192. The author notes that in the past, the family and church prepared the worker
for his later years. Today, however, such preparation is an individual concern. Industry
has failed to promote retirement preparation programs since it views workers as a com-
modity and retirement as a control, i.e., a method of eliminating "deadwood." Government
likewise has not made a significant effort to ready its older workers for retirement.
52 Cyrus-Lutz & Gaitz, supra note 35, at 166. In fact, gerontologists have found that
denial is one of the most effective methods of countering the "age syndrome." A signifi-
cant number of the elderly disassociate themselves from the aged and maintain that they
are younger than their actual chronological age. A "positive" aspect of this denial is.
found in the observation that self-identification as "old" usually brings with it negative
connotations. See Peters, supra note 35, at ?0.
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AGE DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION
The Civil Rights Act of 1964583 prohibits an employer from dis-
charging or refusing to hire a person because of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.54 In 1967, Congress passed the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA).55 The Act provides that absent a bona
fide occupational qualification, reasonably necessary to operate the
business,5 6 it shall be unlawful "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual
because of such individual's age .... 57
There are a number of significant exceptions to the seemingly
broad coverage of the above-quoted passage. First, the Act applies only
to workers between the ages of 40 and 64.11 Second, it excludes em-
ployees of the federal government 59 and private employers with fewer
than 20 regular employees. 60 In addition, the Senate Special Committee
on Aging reports that there is a clear-cut need for vigorous enforcement
of the Act since, from the time of the ADEA's enactment through the
53 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (Supp. III, 1973), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et $eq.
(1970).
54 42 id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
55 29 id. §§ 621 et seq. The congressional findings which led to the enactment of this
legislation are summarized in § 621:
621. Congressional statement of findings and purpose
(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that-
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find
themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and espe-
cially to regain employment when displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardiess of potential for job per-
formance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise desirable
practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons;(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment
with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and employer acceptability is,
relative to the younger ages, high among older workers; their numbers are
great and growing; and their employment problems grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary dis-
crimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce and the free
flow of goods in commerce.
(b) It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrim-
ination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment.
56 See id. § 623(f)(1).
57 Id. § 623(a)(1).
58Id. § 631 (Supp. I1, 1973).
59 Id. § 630(b) (1970). Originally, this section also excluded the employees of state
governments and political subdivisions thereof. This exclusion was eliminated, however, by
the 1974 amendments to the Act. Act of Apr. 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(2),
-8 Stat. 74, amending 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 630(b)(2) (Supp.
1975)).
6029 U.S.C.A. § 630(b) (Supp. 1975). Prior to the 1974 amendments, the number of
workers needed to invoke the Act's protection was 25.
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1972 fiscal year, only 136 actions had been filed by the Department of
Labor, approximately 36 per year.61
Thus, despite recognition of the existence and detrimental effects
-of age discrimination, Congress has limited the protection of the Act to
those between ages 40 and 64, i.e., to the middle aged. Why did Con-
gress not go beyond age 64? The Committee reports provide no answer.
The House Committee on Education and Labor reported that it
lowered the age limit of 45 by 5 years on the ground that age discrim-
ination became evident at age 40. It rejected further lowerings of the
age limit reasoning that such action would lessen the bill's primary
objective -promotion of employment opportunities for older work-
-ers.612 This silence on the part of the legislature has permitted some
parties to infer that Congress thereby approved discrimination against
the employment of workers over age 65.6 On the other hand, one can
argue that Congress enacted the ADEA to protect that age group most
susceptible to age discrimination, yet lacking the benefits of social secu-
rity and other age-related forms of compensation. According to this
view, Congress recognized the evil inherent in age discrimination, but
made only an initial effort to combat its most flagrant abuses.
Age discrimination legislation at the state level is of recent
-vintage, the great majority of such statutes having been passed in the
1960's.64 These, like the ADEA, usually are restricted to ages 40-65 and
contain a significant number of exceptions to the scope of their cover-
61 See SPECIAL Coart. REPORT, supra note 34, at 66. Enforcement of the Act is en-
trusted to the Wage and Hour Division of the Employment Standards Administration of
the Department of Labor. Age bias is only one of the Division's many responsibilities. As
a result, only limited resources can be allocated thereto. Even where an action is brought,
the courts could find the age limitation to be "a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business" and thus per-
missible under the Act. See 29 US.C. § 623(f)(I) (1970); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975) (company's refusal to con-
sider applicants over the age of 35 for the position of bus driver upheld). See also
Kovarsky & Kovarsky, Economic, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Age Discrimination
Laws in Employment, 27 VAND. L. REv. 839, 875-912 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Kovarsky
& Kovarsky].
62 HOUSE CoMAr. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, AGE DISCRIMUNATION IN EMPLOYMENT Acr
oF 1967, H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967). See also Infirm Legislative
Judgment, supra note 38, at 1332-35.
63 See Brief for Defendant at 11, Armstrong v. Howell, 371 F. Supp. 48 (D. Neb. 1974)
(mem.). See also notes 1-3 and accompanying text supra.
64 As of February 1, 1973, 34 states and Puerto Rico have legislated against age dis-
-crinination in employment. The scope of these provisions, however, vary significantly.
Summary of Provisions Under State Laws on Age Discrimination in Employment, INDUS.
GRONrOLOGY, Summer, 1973 at 69. See generally Brennan, State Legislation Prohibiting
Discrimination in Employment Because of Age, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 539 (1967); Kovarsky &
Kovarsky, supra note 61, at 915-25.
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age, prompting the Senate Special Committee to label them "more
loophole than law." 65
Absent statutory protection, what options are open to the govern-
mental worker who believes himself capable of continuing his work but
for a compulsory retirement regulation? First, he can hope to be rehired
on a yearly or perhaps part-time basis if his employer sees fit to offer
further employment.66 Second, he can seek a similar position in the
private sector. Third, he can, as did Ms. Armstrong, bring suit. Al-
though the weight of authority undeniably is in accord with Armstrong,
an argument can be made that mandatory retirement contravenes the
concepts of equal protection and due process of law.
THE EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENTS
Justice Stewart has written that the function of the equal protec-
tion clause "is simply to measure the validity of classifications created
by state laws." 6 Since the fourteenth amendment applies only to the
states, the federal government has been subjected to the concept of
equal protection by a more circuitous route emanating from the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. In dealing with federal classifica-
tions, the Court justifies its equal protection analysis with the terse
observation: "while the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection
clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be
violative of due process.' "68 For the federal civil servant opposing com-
pulsory retirement, this signifies that the equal protection standards
applied to state actions will likewise gauge the classifications created by
the federal government.
Under traditional equal protection analysis, legislative acts are pre-
sumed constitutional, and governmental bodies are given wide latitude
in enacting laws that treat some classes of individuals differently from
others. In such circumstances, the act will be upheld if facts exist, or are
presumed to exist, which show the statute to be a reasonable means of
achieving a legitimate governmental goal.69 By characterizing a case as
65 SPECIAL Comm. REPORT, supra note 34, at 67. The committee found that legislation
differs greatly from state to state with regard to age limitations, exemptions, types of
prohibited activity and enforcement sanctions. See Kovarsky & Kovarsky, supra note 61.
66 In Armstrong, the county attorney suggested the possibility of temporary employ-
ment as an answer to plaintiff's grievance. See Brief for Defendant at 18, Armstrong v.
Howell, 871 F. Supp. 48 (D. Neb. 1974) (mem.).
67 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original).
68 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964), quoting Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954); accord, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969). See also Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 (1973).
69 In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), a case upholding a statute requiring
all businesses to close on Sunday except those deemed necessary for recreational purposes,
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one to which the presumption of constitutionality applies, the party
opposing the statute faces the often overwhelming burden of proving
that the legislature had no factual basis for its classification or that it
treated a given set of facts in a wholly irrational manner.70
Nevertheless, if the statutory classification is based on the criteria
of race,71 national origin,72 alienage,73 or in certain circumstances indi-
gency,7 4 illegitimacy,75 or sex,7 6 or if it infringes on a constitutionally
protected right,77 then the presumption of constitutionality vanishes.
Chief Justice Warren gave what is perhaps the classic explanation of what has become
known as the "rational basis" test:
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are
presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in
practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
Id. at 425-26.
70 For example, Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949), involved
a challenge to a South Carolina statute prohibiting life insurance companies and their
agents from acting as undertakers and barring undertakers from selling life insurance.
The respondent insurance company was the only life insurance company in the state
established in selling funeral insurance. The company and its agents, most of whom were
undertakers, claimed the act was arbitrary, irrational, and a patent display of the power
of the insurance lobby. In rejecting respondent's plea, the Court ruled that "[the forum
for the correction of ill-considered legislation is a responsive legislature," stating tersely:
We cannot say that South Carolina is not entitled to call the funeral insurance
business an evil. Nor can we say that the statute has no relation to the elimination
of those evils. There our inquiry must stop.
Id. at 224 (footnote omitted).
71 See Korematsu v. United States, 523 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
72 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
73 See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646-47 (1948).
74 See Griffin v. Illinois, 851 U.S. 12 (1956).
75 See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1973) (per curiam); Weber v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972).
7 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal.
3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 517 P.2d
599 (1974).
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), is not to the contrary. Here the Court held
that a state's disability insurance fund could rightfully exclude normal pregnancies from
coverage and not be found to discriminate against women. Since the compensation fund
was of limited size and not all disabilities were covered, as, for example, nonhospitalized
disabilities lasting less than eight days and disabilities resulting "from - . . court commit-
ment as a . . . drug addict, or sexual psychopath," the state could use any reasonable
means to select the compensable illnesses. Id. at 488 (footnotes omitted). The Court was
careful to distinguish the illness-based classification from the purely sex-based classification
struck down in Frontiero. Id. at 496 n.20. For further discussion of sex discrimination see
notes 79-87 and accompanying text infra.
Geduldig does, however, demonstrate the Court's reduced scrutiny of legislative
classifications involving distribution of limited funds, the so-called "trust fund" doctrine.
See also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (state welfare authorities allowed to
compensate a higher percentage of the needs of the blind and disabled than those of
families with dependent children); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (state
allowed to limit the total amount of welfare a family may receive regardless of family
size).
77 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare durational residency require-
ments infringe on right to interstate movement). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
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The Court has historically been wary of legislative acts which single out
"discrete and insular minorities"78 or diminish rights secured by the
Constitution. Thus subjected to a court's strict scrutiny, the discrimina-
tory enactment can be saved only if it is supported by a compelling
governmental reason. The court, not the state, is the arbiter of whether
the reasons proffered by the state for maintaining the restriction are
compelling, and few if any justifications can satisfy the demands of this
more rigorous scrutiny.
The Elderly as a Suspect Class - A Basis for Strict Scrutiny
It is crucial at the outset to determine which standard of equal
protection review applies in the case of the employee who, solely be-
cause of a classification based on advanced age, is compelled to retire
from governmental service. Since most mandatory retirement regula-
tions affect workers over age 65, the initial inquiry is whether the per-
sons in this age bracket share with racial minorities, women, aliens, and
illegitimates an affinity of traits so as to justify their inclusion within
the small circle of classes protected by strict judicial scrutiny.
In Frontiero v. Richardson,9 the Supreme Court outlined the
characteristics of the inherently suspect classification. Frontiero in-
volved the validity of a federal regulation which allowed a male in the
armed services to claim his wife as a dependent without regard to
whether she was in fact dependent on him, but required a servicewoman
to prove that her husband was dependent on her for over one-half of his
support. The plaintiff, a female Air Force lieutenant, claimed that this
sex-based classification was as inherently suspect as those based upon
race or national origin. Four members of the Court found that it was,80
and Justice Stewart, concurring, found that the statute "worked an
invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution."8'
Writing for the four-Justice plurality, Justice Brennan cited the
nation's "long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination."8 2 The
romantic stereotype of women, so firmly rooted in the national con-
(law prohibiting obtaining an abortion in the early stages of pregnancy violates right of
personal privacy); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (state durational residency
requirements unduly infringe on the right to vote).
78 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
79411 U.S. 677 (1973).
80justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and White believed that the classification
was inherently suspect.
81411 U.S. at 691.
82 Id. at 684. The plurality noted that during much of the 19th century, the status
of women has been similar to that of blacks in the pre-Civil War South, neither being
able to "hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names." Id. at 685.
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sciousness, created the incapacitating "cage" of married women's codes88
and decisions such as Muller v. Oregon84 where, in language remi-
niscent of recent cases dealing with the aged, a unanimous Court stated:
Doubtless there are individual exceptions, and there are many
respects in which she has an advantage over him; but looking at
it from the viewpoint of the effort to maintain an independent
position in life, she is not upon an equality. Differentiated by these
matters from the other sex, she is properly placed in a class by
herself .... 85
Furthermore, the Frontiero plurality found "sex, like race and national
origin, [to be] an immutable characteristic determined solely by the
accident of birth" frequently bearing "no relation to [the] ability to
perform ... ."I'l These factors distinguished it from nonsuspect criteria
such as physical disability or intelligence.87
83 In Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971),
the Supreme Court of California held:
Laws which disable women from full participation in the political, business and
economic arenas are often characterized as "protective" and beneficial. Those
same laws applied to racial or ethnic minorities would readily be recognized as
invidious and impermissible. The pedestal upon which women have been
placed has all too often, upon cioser inspection, been revealed as a cage. We
conclude that the sexual classifications are properly treated as suspect, particu-
larly when those classifications are made with respect to a fundamental interest
such as employment.
Id. at 20, 485 P,2d at 541, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
84 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (statute limiting employment of women in factories or laundries
to 10 hours per day permissible).
85 Id. at 422. In Weiss v. Walsh, 324 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 461 F.2d
846 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973), Fordham University was allowed to
revoke its offer of the state-sponsored Albert Schweitzer Chair in Humanities from the
eminent philosopher Professor Paul Weiss because state law prohibited the employment
of a candidate over age 65. Notwithstanding documented evidence that chronological age
frequently bears less than a convincing relation to intellectual achievement, see, e.g.,
BIRREN, supra note 40, at 207-12, Judge Tyler held that age ceilings did not violate
equal protection. Reasoning that age "generally bears some relation to mental and
physical capacity," he continued:
Notwithstanding great advances in gerontology, the era when advanced age ceases
to bear some reasonable statistical relationship to diminished capacity or lon-
gevity is still future. It cannot be said, therefore, that age ceilings upon eligi-
bility for employment are inherently suspect, although their application will
inevitably fall injustly [sic] in the individual case.
324 F. Supp. at 77. The opinion does not reveal the sources of the court's statistical
correlation between age and diminished capacity. Dr. A. T. Welford, director of the
10-year Cambridge study of aging and its effects on human skill, could find no such
correlation. See text accompanying notes 122-23 infra. There is reason to believe, more-
over, that the diminished capacity cited by the court as the raison d'etre for age
ceilings arises from policies, such as age ceilings, which tend to isolate the aged. "[M]any,
or most, people who undergo degradation of behavior with advancing age do so because
of disease and social deprivation rather than because such behavior is a pattern of normal
senescence." BnmEN, supra note 40, at 218.
86411 U.S. at 686.
87 The plurality in Frontiero found implicit support for its conclusion that sex-based
classifications should be subjected to the strict scrutiny standard of review in Reed v.
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Another recent Supreme Court decision provides additional in-
sight into what will be considered a suspect class. In San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez,88 plaintiffs instituted a class
action challenging the Texas system of financing public education
largely through the local property taxes collected in each particular
district. The complaint alleged that this system discriminated against
the poor and interfered with the "fundamental right" of education.
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Powell was unable to find a
definable category of "poor" people created by the taxing system.8 9 Nor
could the plaintiffs show an absolute deprivation of the desired educa-
tional benefit.90 The language of the Court in refusing to apply strict
scrutiny to the Texas system, however, is relevant to the potential sus-
pect nature of the aged as a class:
[I]t is clear that appellees' suit asks this Court to extend its most
exacting scrutiny to review a system that allegedly discriminates
against a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the
common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less
taxable wealth than other districts. The system of alleged discrimi-
nation and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia
of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to com-
mand extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.91
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), an earlier sex discrimination case which struck down a statutory
preference for males in the granting of letters of administration. Although the Court in
Reed recognized that the statutory preference involved a rational underpinning, it held
it to be constitutionally infirm.
Clearly the objective of reducing the workload on probate courts by eliminating
one class of contests [intrafamily] is not without some legitimacy. . . . [But] [t]o
give a mandatory preterence to members of either sex over members of the other,
merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the
very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
Id. at 76. See also Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974). In this case the Social Secu-
rity Act's absolute denial of disability insurance benefits to illegitimate children born
after the onset of the parent's disability was struck down on equal protection grounds
despite the Government's claim that such a statute was necessary to avoid spurious claims.
88411 U.S. 1 (1973).
89 Id. at 22-23. The Court found no basis for assuming that the poorest families were
clustered in the poorest property districts. A study in Connecticut had shown that poor
families were often found in commercial and industrial areas which provide an attractive
source of property taxes.
90Id. at 25-26. In a survey of 10% of Texas school districts, 90%, of the sample
revealed a pattern contradicting plaintiff's assumptions. In these districts, those with the
lowest median family incomes were spending more on education than were the wealthier.
Id. at 26-27.
91 Id. at 28 (footnotes omitted).
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Do the aged have the traditional indicia of suspectness set forth in
Frontiero and San Antonio?
The first obstacle encountered is defining the class affected by the
statute. Unlike San Antonio, where the allegedly victimized persons
constituted a class whose membership could not be precisely defined,
the typical mandatory retirement statute covers all those over a certain
age. Second, compulsory retirement effects a total deprivation. 2 The
aged person is abruptly severed from government employment, while
his younger colleague is not only still employed, but, under most civil
service statutes, can only be removed for cause.93 The third considera-
tion is whether the aged are saddled with a history of purposeful mis-
treatment and political powerlessness so as to command what Justice
Powell, in San Antonio, called the "Court's most exacting scrutiny."
Mandatory retirement statutes lack the antiquity of the black codes of
the ante bellum South or the married women's codes discussed in
Frontiero,94 but the increased utilization of such statutes during this
century has been evidenced by the marked disappearance of the older
worker from the labor force to a "retirement" of usually marginal
income. 5 Another trait which the aged share with racial minorities,
aliens, and until very recently, women, is the inability to change their
92 The prospect of returning on an annual or part-time basis or finding a similar
position in the private sector does not reduce the degree of deprivation. As of the moment
of retirement, the employee's tenure, salary, and position as a civil servant cease. Cafeteria
& Rest. Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), does not hold to the contrary.
There the Court upheld the summary revocation of a cook's security clearance which
had the effect of depriving her of access to her place of employment. Holding that she
had not been arbitrarily deprived of a constitutionally protected right, the Court focused
on the fact that she had been offered a similar position at a nonclassified location. "All
that was denied her was the opportunity to work at one isolated and specific military
installation." Id. at 896. The same cannot be said for the federal civil service employee
retired under 5 U.S.C. § 8335(a) (1970) which provides in pertinent part: "Except as
otherwise provided by this section, an employee who becomes 70 years of age and com-
pletes 15 years of service shall be automatically separated from the service." In addition,
the possibility of continuing in a similar position is reduced to a fiction when one con-
siders the incidence of age discrimination and the virtual monopoly exercised by govern-
ment over many employment fields such as law enforcement, social services, and education.
93 See Note, Substantive Due Process: The Extent of Public Employees' Protection
from Arbitrary Dismissal, 122 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1647 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Substantive
Due Process].
94 See notes 82-84 and accompanying text supra. The significance of age 65 as the
standard age for the commencement of retirement benefits as well as compulsory retire-
ment can be traced to Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck's social security program of 1887.
It was here that age 65 was first designated as the time at which retirement benefits
would begin. See 113 CoNG. Rac. 31,256 (1967) (remarks of Senator Young).
95 Justice Brennan in Frontiero noted that 43% of women over the age of 16 were in
the labor force. 411 U.S. at 689 n.23. It is projected that in 1975, the number of men aged
65 and over in the labor force will have dwindled to approximately 23%, down from over
68% in 1900. Schwartz, Retirement: Termination or Transition, 29 GEaMATcs, May, 1974,
at 190, 191.
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inferior status through the political process. Professor Robert Binstock
of Brandeis University's Department of Politics and Social Welfare has
analyzed the potential of the aged to use politics as a mechanism of
improving their economic position. 96 He finds that the aged lack the
cohesive group identity necessary for decisive political action. Those
better off neither identify themselves as aged nor identify with the
problems confronting the aged. But even if the aged poor could unite,
constituting a group numerically far from insignificant, Binstock con-
cludes their influence would be de minimis:
Their capacity for militant, direct action is virtually nonexistent.
Retired persons, especially those with little income, have no lever-
age for disrupting American society through economic action.
They cannot slow down production or strike. And those most
likely to identify as the disadvantaged aged - the 25% below the
poverty line - are hardly in a position to undertake effective
consumer boycotts.9T
As noted above, psychological studies indicate that workers asso-
ciate the onset of old age with the time of their mandatory retirement 98
The evidence is abundant that the aged are as subject to debilitating
stereotypes as have been racial minorities, women, and foreigners. In
Brown v. Board of Education,9 9 the Court found that the forced separa-
tion of black children from their white counterparts under sanction of
law created a sense of inferiority in the black children and retarded
their educational development. In ringing down the curtain on an
odious chapter of American history, Chief Justice Warren declared that
"[t]o separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone."' 00
Much of the available research indicates that the legally sanctioned
separation of older workers from their younger associates without re-
gard to diminished capacity is as invidious in its effects as was the vestige
of Jim Crow condemned in Brown.10 1 The courts that have thus far
96 See Binstock, Interest-Group Liberalism and the Politics of Aging, 12 GERONTOLOGISr
265 (1972).
97 Id. at 279.
98 See notes 39-43 and accompanying text supra.
99 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
100 Id. at 494.
101 Numerous studies suggest that society in general stereotypes aging and the
aged with negative evaluations. The stereotype reflects the expectation that old
age is a time characterized by a decreasingly active role in life, economic insecu-
rity, loneliness, resistance to change, poor health, and failing mental and physical
powers. In short, old age is not seen as conducive to feelings of adequacy, adjust-
ment, usefulness, and security.
Peters, supra note 35, at 72-73. See also note 47 supra.
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upheld the constitutionality of mandatory retirement statutes have done
so without requiring the government to supply even a modicum of data
to demonstrate the rationality of singling out the aged for "special
treatment." In the only case to so require, Murgia v. Massachusetts
Board of Retirement,02 the information supplied by the State under-
mined any claim to rationality that the classification may have had
since losses in personnel for medical reasons other than injury actually
decreased with age. 10 3
One will search the decisions in vain for any mention of the psy-
chological damage inflicted by forced retirement. When dealing with
the aged, courts have chosen to rely on the types of presumptions and
cliches prevalent at the turn of the century. For example, in Gault v.
Garrison,104 a teacher challenged a statute requiring her retirement at
age 65. A comprehensive brief was filed in the federal district court
hearing the case, bringing to the court's attention serious questions con-
cerning the supposed decrement in work capacity accompanying old
age. In sustaining the statute the court wrote:
The age of sixty-five for retirement is a classification which must
be accorded a presumption of constitutionality, and an ascertain-
able rational basis will serve to uphold it. It has long been accepted
in our society as an age when most people, because of diminishing
mental and physical stamina, are no longer able to endure the
rigors of full-time employment. This chronological demarcation
has generally proved to be reasonable and fair.05
In Plessy v. Ferguson,0 6 the Supreme Court faced the issue of
102 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass. 1974) (three-judge court), prob. juris. noted, 95 S. Ct.
1978 (1975).
103 Id. at 7.56. See note 6 supra.
104 Civil No. 74-C-931 (N.D. Ill., May 22, 1974) (mem.), appeal docketed, No. 74-1579,
7th Cir., June 20, 1974.
105Id. at 3 (emphasis added). These broad presumptions of lack of stamina and
strength were until recently assumed validly applicable to women. In Weeks v. Southern
Bell Tel. 8- Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969), the employer maintained women could
be reasonably excluded from the position of switchman since it required the lifting of
weights which averaged 30 pounds. In holding for the female plaintiff, the court reasoned:
Southern Bell has ... introduced no evidence concerning the lifting abilities of
women. Rather, they would have us "assume," on the basis of a "stereotyped
characterization" that few or no women can safely lift 30 pounds, while all men
are treated as if they can. While one might accept, arguendo, that men are
stronger on the average than women, it is not clear that any conclusions about
relative lifting ability would follow.... [It can be argued tenably that technique
is as important as strength in determining lifting ability. Technique is hardly a
function of sex. What does seem dear is that using these class stereotypes denies
desirable positions to a great many women perfectly capable of performing the
duties involved.
Id. at 235-26. Just as women can compensate by technique, the aged have been able to
compensate by using skills accrued over time. See, e.g., A. War.roa, AGING AND HIuAN
SKrr 286 (1958) [hereinafter cited as WrxoRD].
106 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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whether the State of Louisiana could legally provide separate railway
cars for the white and "colored" races. Here, the demarcation was based
on the well-known and long-accepted physiological distinction of color.
Over the scathing dissent of Justice Harlan, the Court perceived no
actual damage arising from the forced separation of one race from the
other.10 7 In a similar manner, the courts have perceived no damage in
the forced separation of the aged from their employment and from the
social interaction that is an integral part thereof. Yet, as previously dis-
cussed, the effects of such age-based sanctions can be devastating. 08 It
is submitted, given the economic plight of the aged in America 00 and
their scientifically supported claims of continued work capacity, that
mandatory retirement regulations share with the statute Justice
Brennan found constitutionally offensive in Frontiero an affinity of
traits sufficient to invoke the Court's strictest scrutiny:
[T]hese statutes seize upon a group.. . who have historically suf-
fered discrimination in employment, and rely on the effects of this
past discrimination as a justification for heaping on additional
economic disadvantages.110
The Right to Work as Constitutionally Secured - An Alternative Basis
for Strict Scrutiny
The second basis for invoking the strict scrutiny test is in the case
of a legislative classification which infringes on a fundamental right. For
example, in Shapiro v. Thompson,"' state welfare eligibility statutes
imposed a one year durational residency requirement as a condition
to the receipt of benefits. The statutes were held unconstitutional by
the Court on the ground that they interfered with the constitutional
right of interstate travel since they deterred welfare recipients from
exercising this right.
The Court, however, has never held that the right to work is con-
stitutionally secured. Admittedly, in Truax v. Raich,12 where the Court
107 We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored
race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that con-
struction upon it.
Id. at 551.
108 See note 37 supra.109 See note 34 supra. Graphic documentation of the mistreatment of the aged both
in the United States and abroad is found in S. DE BEAuvom, THE COMING OF AGE (1972)
and in C. TOWNSEND, OLD AGE: TaE LAST SEGREGATION (1970).
110 Frontiero v. Richarson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 n.22 (1973).
111 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
112 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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struck down an Arizona law which required anyone employing more
than five persons to employ not less than 80 percent native born citizens
or eligible voters of the United States, there is dictum which indicates
that the right to earn a living "is of the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth]
Amendment to secure."1 3 Nevertheless, the Court based its decision
on the impermissibility of state legislation which denies employment on
the grounds of race or nationality.114
Thus, although it has been suggested that mandatory retirement
infringes upon the "fundamental" right to pursue a lawful calling, 15
no such right has been recognized by the Court. Nor is one likely to be.
As Justice Harlan, dissenting in Shapiro, explains:
Virtually every state statute affects important rights. This Court
has repeatedly held, for example, that the traditional equal pro-
tection standard is applicable to statutory classifications affecting
such fundamental matters as the right to pursue a particular
occupation, the right to receive greater or smaller wages or to
work more or less hours, and the right to inherit property....
[T]o extend the "compelling interest" rule to all cases in which
such rights are affected would go far toward making this Court
a "super-legislature.""16
The Disputed Rationality of Discrimination Against the Elderly
Despite the conviction of many that the aged constitute a suspect
class, it can be argued that the distribution of the aged throughout all
economic strata of society, coupled with their presence in the legisla-
tures as well as on the highest judicial tribunals, is fatal to satisfaction of
113 Id. at 41.
114 An alternative rationale for this holding was that the state's restriction on the
employment of aliens interfered with the primacy of Congress in the area of immigration
and that to deny these aliens the right to earn a living would be tantamount to the state's
denying them access to the country. Id. at 42-43.
The Court has afforded stringent equal protection scrutiny to state classifications which
resulted in the exclusion of many persons who, except for statutory restrictions, were
fully competent to work. In Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914), the plaintiff, a man with
extensive experience as a train engineer, was convicted for having acted as a conductor
on a freight train without having served for two years as a conductor or brakeman as
required by Texas law. The evidence at trial revealed that engineers must be able to
act as conductors under the rules of all railroads in case the regular conductor should
become disabled en route. The Court held the statute unconstitutional on the grounds
that it arbitrarily prohibited competent men from entering private employment and
established the order by which men could be promoted in the private sector. While it is
possible to argue that this case turned on the state's interference in the private sector,
such a rationale appears weak in view of the extensive governmental regulation of the
railroad industry. It appears more likely that the Court could not accept the state's abso-
lute refusal to employ men of demonstrable skill. See id. at 641.
115 Infirm Legislative Judgment, supra note 88, at 1338-40.
116 394 U.S. at 661 (footnotes omitted).
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the criteria for suspectuess found in the heretofore recognized suspect
classes." 7 If a court accepts this reasoning, as all thus far considering it
have, and the right to work is not established as fundamental, the oppo-
nent of mandatory retirement must assume the burden of proving that
no rational basis for such regulations exists. In this situation, the atti-
tude of the court towards the legislation at hand is crucial. If, as in
Gault, the court assumes that facts exist so as to justify the legislation,
plaintiff's obstacles approach the insurmountable. On the other hand,
if the court requires that the government make a prima facie showing
of rationality, in view of the results of research in the field, the outcome
could parallel that of Murgia.
It is submitted that the approach taken by the three-judge court in
Murgia is the more sound. Where the legislative purpose is to combat a
recognized evil and the only dispute centers around the precision of the
classification, perhaps the court would be justified in assuming facts
exist to justify the type of legislation involved. But where the entire
type of legislation is alleged to be without factual justification and
supported by deep-seated prejudice, it is suggested that the court would
be in error if it labeled such a statute rational without some initial
factual inquiry. It is necessary at this point to examine some of the
many investigations into the relationship between chronological age
and work capacity.
A generation ago, the realm of test validity and psycho-social study
was deemed beyond the province of the court. Accordingly, Justice
Frankfurter, in an opinion sustaining a statute denying females bar-
tending licenses unless they were the daughters or wives of male owners,
could declare: "The Constitution does not require legislatures to reflect
sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it
requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards." 118
117 These distinctions convinced Dr. Milton Barron that the aged, like women, were
not a true minority but rather a quasi-minority, i.e., a group subject to the traditional
minorities' experience of frustration and subordination, but lacking the theretofore recog-
nized characteristics of minority groups.
Unlike the traditional minorities, neither women nor the aged are socially orga-
nized as independently functioning subgroups in American society. On the con-
trary, they are found within the same families as the alleged majorities so that
intergroup relations cannot possibly be involved in the full sense of the term.
Hence the avoidance of the minority concept and the utilization of "quasi-
minority" seem justified in the case of the aged as well as women.
Minority Group Characteristics, supra note 44, at 477.
118 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948). In dissenting, Justice Rutledge, joined
by Justices Douglas and Murphy, stated:
While the equal protection clause does not require a legislature to achieve "ab-
stract symmetry" or to classify with "mathematical nicety," that clause does require
lawmakers to refrain from invidious distinctions of the sort drawn by the statute
challenged in this case.
Id. at 467-68 (footnotes omitted).
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Today, however, no court can close its eyes to the importance of
job-related tests and the insidious effect of test bias. The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission has issued guidelines calling for a sig-
nificant correlation between test results and important elements of the
job for which the candidates are being tested. 19 The fact that the test
was prepared by professionals in the testing field affords no insulation
from scrutiny. The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 20
stated: "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as
'built in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measur-
ing job capability." 121 Thus, tests which purportedly verify the inability
of millions of people to perform as competently as individuals on the
other side of a chronological meridian must be gauged with critical
detachment and an eye for "built in headwinds." Although some of the
studies conducted during the last few decades appear to have contained
headwinds of gale force, the overall results are germane to the question
of whether mandatory retirement enjoys a rational basis.
One of the earliest comprehensive studies of the effects of aging on
physical and mental capacity was the Cambridge project conducted in
England from 1946-1956 under the direction of Dr. A. T. Welford.122
Although many of his test models appear to favor younger subjects by
utilizing tasks that reward such factors as the amount of schooling,
ability to test in a laboratory environment, or capacity to perform
meaningless tasks, Welford's conclusions negate the validity of any age-
based generalizations. He first found that with age there was a slowing
in sensorimotor tasks, perception, problem solving, and other situations
stressing mental rather than motor activity. As age increased, however,
he found increasing variation between individuals. In fact, a substantial
number of old people performed as well or better than the average of
the younger subjects. As to whether these results provide the basis for
an inference that the aged as a group are less capable, Welford wrote:
"None of these tendencies is, however, regular enough from one situa-
tion to another for us to be able to regard it as implying any universal
rule or law."' 23
119 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607 et seq. (1972). These guidelines require the employer relying
on tests to have available data demonstrating that the tests relied upon significantly
correlate with important elements of the work behavior comprising the job or jobs for
which the candidate is being tested. Id. § 1607.4.
'120401 U.S. 424 (1971). In this case, the use of intelligence tests and high school
diploma requirements for promotion in defendant's plant was challenged because such
use rendered a disproportionate percentage of blacks ineligible for promotion. Since not
correlated with job performance, the practice was struck down.
121 Id. at 432.
122 See WmFxoRD, supra note 105.
123 Id. at 283.
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Birren's study of actual work output and its relation to age resulted
in the observation that productivity remains constant through the mid-
fifties, with a slight falling off thereafter. This decrement, however, is
not manifested in all trades. For example, no decline was noted in the
productivity of women officeworkers over age 65. Even in those indus-
tries that do demonstrate the "post 55" decline, the older worker's out-
put usually remains above the required level and individual variations
are large. Many older employees even outperform their more youthful
counterparts. 24
Dr. Botwinick's recent treatise on the aging process, 2 5 although not
dealing extensively with the employment capacity of the aged, supports
the view that any broad generalizations concerning the abilities of the
aged are presently impossible. One of the most common assumptions is
that responses to environmental stimulation slow with age. Botwinick's
research reveals, however, that the evidence supporting this assumption
is open to serious question. One study compares the reaction times of
older and younger subjects. When the young athletes were removed
from the sample, there was no difference between the 18-to-22-year-old
subjects and those between the ages of 68 to 86.126 He also found such
substantial individual differences in a number of studies comparing
reaction time - with many older subjects outperforming younger ones
- that an inference of slowing of responses in later life could not be
drawn. In light of the fact that motivation and practice tend to reduce
age-related slowing, Botwinick concludes that the evidence pointing to
a slowing of higher level functioning with age is, at best, equivocal.127
124 BIREN, supra note 40, at 200-04. At the conclusion of his study, Dr. Welford sug-
gested that slight variations in work environment, geared to the work pattern of older
workers, could help overcome many of the problems presumed inherent in age. WuoRD,
supra note 105, at 287. Although Dr. Welford does not elaborate on how industry might
capitalize on the observed patterns of the older worker, other studies dealing with the
retraining of older workers have addressed this issue. Dr. Ross A. McFarland has sum-
marized how training methods might be adapted to the learning capacities of the older
person.
Older persons learn more readily if material is presented in ways allowing them
to understand the task essentials, such as a selective presentation of essential
areas.
Pace of instruction should be slowed to enable full comprehension or the
pace should be under the trainee's control.
Learning by activity methods yields better results than memorizing instruc-
tions for translation into action.
It seems essential to relate instructions and task as directly as possible, with
opportunities for ambiguity kept at a minimum, and to avoid the learning of
errors which may be unlearned only with difficulty.
McFarland, The Need for Functional Age Measurements in Industrial Gerontology, Imnus.
GmowroLoGy, Fall, 1973, at 1, 15 [hereinafter cited as McFarland].
125 See BoTWImcK, supra note 49.
126 Id. at 173-74.
127 Id. at 177. A study conducted by K. Warner Schaie of West Virginia University
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At first glance, the outcome of studies on learning ability reported
by Botwinick admittedly seem to establish an age-related decrement.
Studies from Welford to Botwinick showed that the elderly do most
poorly in tests under time pressure. But when allowed to pace them-
selves, the elderly improve significantly. Although Botwinick finds that
even with self-pacing the elderly score below younger subjects, it is
doubtful that such tests indicate an actual decrease in cognitive ability
since the poorer performance of older subjects can be traced to such
noncognitive elements as test anxiety and unfamiliarity with testing
procedures . 28
and Charles R. Strother of the University of Washington points to a contrary conclusion.
A group of retired professors approached Dr. Schaie desiring to demonstrate by intensive
studies that their members retained a high level of functioning. After devising a compre-
hensive survey of psychological, social, and physical functioning, the author selected a
group of 50 elderly men and women, all college educated professionals with a mean age
of 76.5, who possessed good health, economic independence, and a satisfactory degree of
social activity. In other words, in this optimal elderly group the factors of economic,
physical, and social deprivation had been minimized.
In testing the group's intellectual ability, memory, and visual-motor functions, the
author found the members' performance to be well below what would have been expected
of them in their prime. The authors' evaluation of their findings concludes:
[IThe state of psychological functioning of this highly selected group was at best
at or slightly below the population average for young adults. The results of our
physical and social studies suggest that this obvious decrement from peak per-
formance is most likely related to a physiological decrement, particularly of a
sensory nature, and probably to the general slowing down of response speed as
well.
Schaie & Strother, Cognitive and Personality Variables in College Graduates of Advanced
Age, in HuMAN AGING AND BEHAVIOR 281, 307 (G. Talland ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
Schaie & Strother]. The significance of these results, however, can be questioned. See note
128 and accompanying text infra.
Perhaps the strongest indication that the Schaie and Strother data focus on nothing
more than test-taking ability is the performance of another optimal group under actual
working conditions. Since 1948, Hastings College of Law has selected its faculty from dis-
tingished professors and deans retired (often mandatorily) from other institutions. A
handbook prepared and published by the Association of American Law Schools and the
Law School Admission Test Council noted that Hastings' "65 Club" had brought to that
law school "a wealth of teaching experience unmatched anywhere." THx PRELAW HANDBOOK
64 (1971-1972 ed.).
128 See BorwiNIcx, supra note 49, at 218-22. Bottvinick cautions:
It is commonly thought that learning ability declines in later life. This may not
be true. It is true, however, that learning performances tend to be poorer in later
life than during young adulthood. To understand this it must be recognized that a
necessary distinction is made between learning as an internal process and per-
formance as an external act. We see only the act and not the process; we infer
that learning ability is poor when we observe only a little or no improvement
in some performance. It is possible to be wrong about this inference because what
may have made for the poor performance was not learning ability as such but
the non-cognitive elements surrounding the act.
Id. at 218.
Haberlandt, in examining many of the same studies considered by Botwinick, also
points to the laboratory environment as the root of many of the "observed" differences.
Furthermore, he finds that initial differences in task performance are often overcome when
the younger and older groups are compared over a longer period of time than the one or
two hours usually allotted in the laboratory. Haberlandt, Learning, Memoy and Age,
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Two common justifications for compulsory retirement are that older
workers present higher accident risks and they are difficult, if not im-
possible, to retrain.129 Serious doubts exist as to the validity of either
assumption. Studies of a large number of formerly retired workers
utilized in industry during World War II revealed not only competent
performance, but greater job stability and fewer accidents than experi-
enced with younger employees. °30 Similar results are obtained from the
accident records of older automobile and bus drivers.131 The widespread
fear that the older worker will be suddenly incapacitated by a heart
attack or other ailment, thereby causing serious injury to himself and
others, has simply not materialized. Over a six-month period in the
airline industry, the mean age of pilots who lost their license for medi-
cal reasons was 40.132 In Murgia, the court found that for state police,
INus. GERONTOLOGY, Fall, 1973, at 20, 29-30 [hereinafter cited as Haberlandt]. But see
Schaie & Strother, supra note 127, at 307 (findings of a decrease in higher level functioning
"cannot be . . . refuted simply by referring to . .. artifacts of sampling").
129 An unusual rationale for justifying mandatory retirement was relied upon in
Aronstam v. Cashman, 132 Vt. 538, 325 A.2d 361 (1974) (per curiam). Here, in upholding
a provision in the state constitution requiring elected judges to retire at age 70, the
Supreme Court of Vermont held the state legislature could reasonably assume that a judge
over the age of 70, if subjected to an incapacitating ailment, would be less likely to step
down than a younger judge similarly incapacitated, thereby disgracing the state judiciary
with his unseemly intransigence.
[W]e recognize the legitimate state interest in requiring for members of the judi-
ciary the highest possible standards obtainable by minimizing as far back as
possible the threat of an obviously disabled judge continuing to preside in full
view of the eyes of the public.
Id. at 543, 325 A.2d at 366.
130 See McFarland, The Older Worker in Industry, 21 HARv. Bus. Rlv. 505, 519 (1943).
131 A comparison of the driving records of persons aged 65 and over with those of
younger drivers showed that the elderly had safety records superior to the records of the
group of drivers aged 85 and under. The percentage of personal and property damage
caused by aged drivers was proportionately below the percentage of licenses held by
them. Freeman, Elderly Drivers: Growing Numbers and Growing Problems, 27 GERIATRICS,
July, 1972, at 46, 47-50 [hereinafter cited as Freeman].
McFarland refers to studies conducted on London bus drivers. These studies revealed
that had drivers over 60 been replaced by men aged 80 or under, the number of accidents
sustained per year would have risen appreciably. The results of studying the accident
records of different age groups, both in the United States and abroad, led McFarland to
conclude:
The deterioration with age in sensory, mental and physiological capacities is not
apparent in the form of increasing accidents until the later decades. It shows
how experience, judgment and compensation for declining abilities can be main-
tamined at a higher level of performance than might be expected.
McFarland, supra note 124, at 9. But see Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859
(7th Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975), discussed in notes 137-49 and accom-
panying text infra.
132 McFarland, supra note 124, at 7. See Freeman, supra note 131, at 52 (research into
relationship between automobile accidents and vascular disease). In O'Donnell v. Shaffer,
491 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) brought suit to force
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to conduct a trial-type evidentiary hearing
concerning the validity of its rule requiring commercial airline pilots to retire at age 60.
The FAA had held hearings in which groups for and against the rle submitted testimony
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noninjury, medical discharges decreased with age.' 33
Retraining older workers for new tasks can be accomplished suc-
cessfully if the learning needs of the older worker are kept in mind.
Recent studies have shown that the format should concentrate on
job essentials, the instruction should be paced to enable full compre-
hension, and learning should be by doing rather than by memorizing
principles. 134 The major obstacle confronting the older worker in ob-
taining such training is not his inability to learn a new skill, but rather
the fact that industry can employ a younger man with less seniority for
less money and recoup more of its training costs due to a longer work
expectancy.
To sustain mandatory retirement statutes under the rational basis
test, the government is not required to show that the policy is the wisest,
most economical, or most congruent with the latest gerontological
theories. All that must be shown is that it is pursuing a legitimate gov-
and briefs. As a result of these hearings the FAA concluded that an individual medical
examination of each pilot would not detect a potential sudden incapacitation. Since some
evidence indicated that risks of sudden incapacitation increased after age 60, the FAA
decided to maintain the age 60 rule until a more accurate system of detection could be
devised. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the ALPA's suit. It held that a
trial-type hearing was not mandated by the due process clause simply because livelihoods
are affected. Id. at 62. Nor did the regulation single out a particular party for special
treatment since it was applied evenly across the board. Id. Finally, given the existence of
contradictory evidence, the court was unable to say that the agency's decision was un-
reasonable. Id. at 63. The applicability of this decision to the mandatory retirement of
civil servants is questionable due to the heavy responsibility of the airline pilot and the
great weight afforded decisions of regulatory agencies. Cf. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 499 F.2d 859, 862-63 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Spurlock v.
United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 218-19 (10th Cir. 1972).
See also Mohler, Functional Aging: Present Status of Assessments Regarding Airline
Pilot Retirement, 44 AERosPAcE MEDICINE 1062 (1973). Dr. Mohler, Chief of the Aeromedical
Applications Division, Office of Aviation Medicine of the FAA, finds that chronological
age does relate to certain physiological breakdowns within the general population. He
notes that aging is often equated with "biological information loss" at the cellular level,
inferring that such information loss could be a preprogrammed individual "self-destruct,"
a control on the numbers of the species. For example, he finds that nonpathological
processes such as menopause and diminishing muscular strength as well as pathologies such
as cancer and arteriosclerosis generally occur in older individuals. The incidence of myo-
cardial infarction in men between the ages of 55 and 59 is nearly four times that of
men aged 40 to 44. Id. at 1064. In light of the above statistics, Dr. Mohler favors the
retention of the mandatory retirement of airline pilots at age 60 until significant
progress is made in
(1) understanding the processes of senescence, (2) measuring the net "functional
age" of a given individual with equipment suitable for general clinical use, and
(3) relating "functional age" to flight performance under given circumstances ....
Id. at 1066. But see Szafran, Psychophysiological Studies of Aging in Pilots, in HUIAN
AGING AND BEHAvIoR 37 (G. Talland ed. 1968). Dr. Szafran's analysis indicates that the
compensatory abilities of the aged individual may eventually cast serious doubts on the
"wear-and-tear" doctrine, a doctrine which Dr. Szafran finds lacking in factual support.
Id. at 70.
aa 376 F. Supp. at 756.
134 See McFarland, supra note 124, at 15; Haberlandt, supra note 128, at 30-31.
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ernmental goal by means of a vehicle not patently irrelevant to that
goal or otherwise capricious. The typical mandatory retirement statute
is enacted to afford fair and equal opportunity of employment and
promote economy and efficiency. These are undoubtedly legitimate
governmental interests.
The remaining question, therefore, is whether fair and equal op-
portunity, admittedly a legitimate goal, is legitimately promoted by
sweeping out all those reaching the age of 65 or 70. No study has been
able to establish the existence of a generally applicable classwide decre-
ment of statistical significance.18 5 The reason appears to lie in the indi-
vidualistic nature of the aging process. As Ross A. McFarland, Professor
Emeritus of the Harvard School of Public Health, writes:
[C]hronological age, as measured in years and months, is not the
same as physiological age. There are great individual differences in
the physical stamina of older persons, and chronological age is
hardly ever a reliable index of that condition. Some boys reach
puberty at 11 and others not until 16. Some men are old at 50,
others at 75. Mental senescence may come prematurely in some;
in others, continued brilliance of intellect defies corporal senility.18 6
The most thorough judicial examination of the relationship be-
tween chronological age and employment capacity took place in Hodg-
son v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.13 The company was accused by the
Secretary of Labor of violating the ADEA by its policy of refusing to
consider applicants over the age of 35 for the position of intercity bus
driver. The company contended that the age limitation was a "bona
fide occupational qualification"'138 since hiring applicants between the
ages of 40 and 65 would increase the likelihood of accidents. The dis-
trict court held that the defendant had failed to demonstrate how ap-
1385 Even the study of Schaie and Strother, supra note 127, at 307, revealed significant
individual differences.
180 McFarland, supra note 124, at 1. Welford reports a study of the performance of
younger and older workers in three skilled operations at two printing firms. Productivity
continued to rise generally to the forties and fifties, and then it declined somewhat, but
less than would have been predicted from the results of many experiments.
The figures suggest that in most cases the skills concerned take many years to
attain full maturity, but that once mastered they show little deterioration with
age, or at any rate that compensation can be made fairly well for any deficiencies.
The fall of productivity in the older age groups may admittedly have been
somewhat greater than the figures indicate because some of the older men con-
tracted out of the incentive scheme and thus furnished no productivity data.
These men, many of whom had remained after normal retiring age, tended to be
less productive than the rest, but were still regarded as worth employing from
an economic point of view.
WELFORD, supra note 105, at 230-31.
137 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
138 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(l) (1970).
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plicants over age 40 would be unable to perform the duties involved.13 9
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. Speaking
through Chief Judge Swiggert, the court held that where the position
in question involves responsibility for the lives of many, the company
need not show that a substantial number of individuals over age 40
could not perform, but need only demonstrate "a rational basis" for
believing that removal of the maximum hiring age would increase the
risk of harm to its passengers. 4
The court then found that defendant satisfied the rational basis test
by showing that statistically its safest driver is between 50 and 55 years
of age with between 16 and 20 years of experience with Greyhound; 41
that medical examinations could not detect potentially incapacitating
diseases;'4 that new drivers are put on the extra-board, less desirable
and more demanding routes, i.e., routes which would unduly tax the
older novice; 43 and finally, that a Department of Transportation study
had revealed that the negative effects of continual driving were more
apparent in older drivers.' 4
It is submitted that the court's application of this standard of
minimal rationality to a private company's concededly discriminatory
139 354 F. Supp. 230, 235-26 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (mem.), rev'd, 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974).
140 [G]reyhound must demonstrate that it has a rational basis in fact to believe
that elimination of its maximum hiring age will increase the likelihood of risk
of harm to its passengers. Greyhound need only demonstrate however a minimal
increase in risk of harm for it is enough to show that elimination of the hiring
policy might jeopardize the life of one more person than might otherwise occur
under the present hiring practice.
499 F.2d at 863.
141 Id. The court concluded that it would be impossible to achieve this blend of age
and experience by hiring an applicant over age 40. Id.
1421Id. at 861-64. The court rejected the Government's argument that older drivers
can compensate for the physical deterioration attendant upon age. Furthermore, the
court found that even were it possible to screen out degenerative disabilities, it would be
difficult if not impossible for Greyhound to "scrutinize the continued fitness of such
drivers on a frequent and regular basis." Id. at 864. The district court reached the oppo-
site conclusion on the basis of federal regulations which require each driver's reaction time
and driving ability under all weather conditions to be checked periodically. In addition,
a physical examination is required every two years up to age 50 and annually thereafter.
154 F. Supp. at 23g.
143 499 F.2d at 864. The court explained the rigors of the extra-board:
While on the extra-board the driver is on call twenty-four hours a day, seven days
a week with as little as two hours' notice, to take runs that the more senior regular
run drivers do not operate. Often these operations involve odd and irregular hours
and, frequently, long charter trips outside the territory served by the regular
routes of Greyhound, that may last up to thirty days.
Id.
144 Id. at 865. The court also found that even with the benefit of youth, extra-board
drivers had over twice as many accidents per million miles driven than regular run
drivers. In light of other studies, however, the advantage of youth remains questionable.
See note 131 supra.
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hiring policy is unwarranted. A legislative act is normally vested with
a presumption of constitutionality. Accordingly, only a rational basis is
needed to overcome a challenge. No such presumption of validity
should apply, however, to corporate acts, especially where the policy is,
at least prima facie, in violation of federal law.
A more disturbing aspect of the Seventh Circuit opinion was its
uncritical acceptance of the defendant's justifications. The court rea-
soned that the district court had imposed too strenuous a burden on
Greyhound by requiring it to affirmatively demonstrate the diminished
ability of applicants over age 40 and then subjecting the company's
proffered excuses to close scrutiny. According to the court of appeals,
the standards urged by the Government and adopted by the district
court would require Greyhound to experiment with the lives of pas-
sengers to establish satisfactory statistical evidence. This view appears
exaggerated in light of the evidence adduced at trial.
The district court had found that:
1. The company's statistics show that its drivers over the age of 40
have a better safety record than those under that age.145
2. Many older drivers had served up to 20 years on the extra-board,
such practices belying the claim that an age 40 ceiling is necessary.
Furthermore, absent from the data submitted by the defendant was
a comparison of the accident records of its older and younger
extra-board drivers. From this omission the court assumed the
better safety record of older drivers applied likewise to the extra-
board.14
3. The rejection of applicants over age 40 with interstate bus
driving experience on the grounds that they could not be "un-
trained" and taught the Greyhound method was irrational since
the defendant's own driver-witnesses had prior commercial driving
experience with large vehicles and had been "untrained." No
evidence was submitted showing why younger drivers could be
"untrained" but those over 40 could not. 47
145 354 F. Supp. at 236. The district court also noted that during 1968-1971, drivers
in the 24 to 40 age group had a substantially higher accident rate than those aged 56 to
60. Id.
146Id. The district court found duty on the extra-board less rigorous than did the
court of appeals.
Neither regular run drivers nor extra board drivers are permitted to drive more
than ten hours and cannot be on duty, including driving, for more than fifteen
hours, without at least eight consecutive hours off.
Id. at 235.
147 Id. at 237.
I cannot accede to a contention which flatly states that all applicants over 40 are
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4. During certain peak periods, Greyhound leased drivers from
other companies, making such drivers part of its operations. Yet
these drivers were not screened and were permitted to drive regard-
less of age.1 48
5. The company's own expert testified that the undetectable,
potentially incapacitating effects of aging could occur in its own
drivers over age 40, yet they were not considered unsafe.149
An alternate phrasing of the rational basis test, appropriate for
gauging the constitutionality of legislative classifications of individuals,
is that not only must the enactment have "a fair and substantial rela-
tion to the object of the legislation," but it must also treat all persons
"similarly circumstanced . . . alike."' 50 In Reed v. Reed,'51 the state
statute's preference for males was aimed at reducing the caseload of
the probate court. The statute was found objectionable because it
sought to achieve this goal through the creation of a legislative prefer-
ence for one of two classes of people even though both classes were
equally entitled to the preference. What amounts to a statutory prefer-
ence for those below age 65 seems similarly vulnerable since no proof
has been presented establishing the existence of their diminished
ability.5 2
Another purported rational basis is purely economic. Retaining
older workers until they leave voluntarily is allegedly expensive and
unwise. Since it is assumed that most older workers do not wish to
retire, fewer jobs would be available, advancements based on seniority
would become less frequent, and a large body of workers with obso-
lescent skills would remain in the labor force. In addition, pension
plans presumably would face radical, perhaps costly alteration. In short,
inflexible, unadaptable and untrainable and, in effect, that is what I am called upon
to do. The defendant has not tendered the necessary statistical evidence to allow
for such a finding. The defendant's policy is not based on personal experience or
observations of new applicants age 40 or over.
Id. at 236.
148 Id. at 237. The age policy at issue was formulated in 1928. The defendant's officers
at trial did not know why that age was originally chosen, but they admitted it was not
based on any "'surveys, inquiries, research studies, statistical studies or any other study to
our knowledge.'" Id. at 288, quoting Trial transcript at 564-65.
149 Id. at 233, citing Trial transcript at 884, 894. See also Kovarsky & Kovarsky, supra
note 61, at 894-901.
250 F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 258 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
'-5 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
152 See In re Wright's Estate, 177 Cal. 274, 170 P. 610 (1918). This case held that a man
could not be denied letters of administration solely on the basis of being 92 years of age.
The evidence presented showed the petitioner to be fully capable of administering the
estate despite his advanced chronological age.
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it is feared that the social ramifications of upsetting this established
policy would be enormous.
This speculation regarding the disruption which could be caused
by the end of mandatory retirement does not appear to be well-
founded.5 5 First, it is clear that not all workers would stay on past
the customary retirement age and that many would retire voluntarily
at such time.154 Second, evidence suggests that not every position va-
cated by a retiree is retained for a younger worker.5 5 This would ap-
pear to undermine the oft-heard basis for eliminating the older worker,
i.e., to make room for the young. Third, the supposed difficulty in
retraining older workers and assessing their "functional age" is very
often an excuse to dismiss the senior employee without further inquiry.
A large body of literature on the feasibility of retraining and assessing
the capacity of older workers is available.156 That this evidence has
been consistently ignored affords some indication of society's unwill-
ingness to change its perspective on aging. Even if the economic con-
sequences of overturning compulsory retirement were shown to be
serious, it is submitted that this should not permit a court to shirk
its duty to prevent irrational or invidious classifications.157
153 See Infirm Legislative Judgment, supra note 38, at 1347-52. The author concludes
that the anticipated adverse consequences which will attend the demise of mandatory
retirement are either nonexistent or greatly exaggerated. His research indicates that:
1. The loss of income to the gross national product caused by the removal of older
workers from the labor force has been estimated to be as high as $10 billion annually.
Id. at 1347.
2. The effect on employee pension plans of hiring older workers is overstated. Ap-
proximately 81% of such plans exclude workers hired beyond a certain age. To handle
those workers who remain after the former mandatory retirement age, a variety of
arrangements are available to adjust any new age-cost differentials. Id. at 1349-50.
3. The retention of workers beyond age 65 will not stifle the promotion of younger
employees since 43% of workers reaching mandatory retirement age would retire
without compulsion. Furthermore, seniority does not correlate uniformly with age,
many younger workers having more seniority than their older colleagues. Studies
have also shown that retiring older workers is not necessary to maintain the younger
employees' desire for promotion. Id. at 1350-52.
154 See generally Kossoris, Early Retirement: An Overview, 4 INDus. Rat., May, 1965,
at 1, 10-12. Here, surveys of governmental and private employees who had retired early
showed a generally favorable attitude toward the decision to retire voluntarily. Recent
economic events, however, cast doubts on whether employees will continue to retire
voluntarily before the compulsory date. This implies that given the opportunity, they
would remain at work longer. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal reported that
early retirements for teachers in Ohio dropped 8.3% and only 20% of eligible Chrysler
workers were opting for early retirement. General Motors workers, however, were retiring
early, as expected. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 11, 1974, at 1, col. 6. Thus, even in difficult
economic times, many workers voluntarily retire before the mandatory age, although the
numbers are somewhat less than in more prosperous years.
155 Bernstein, The Argument Against Early Retirement, 4 INDus. Rat., May, 1965, at
29, 34-36.
156 For an extensive annotated bibliography of the works in this area see Kelleher &
Quirk, Age, Physical Capacity and Work, INDus. GERONTOLOGY, Fall, 1973, at 80.
157 When the Court decided Brown, segregation was required by law in 21 states and
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The medical and psychosocial evidence surveyed indicates that a
strong majority of workers over ages 65 or 70 are capable of carrying
out their responsibilities until some ill-defined future point.55 With
the overwhelming majority of scientific research revealing no basis
whatsoever to generally equate the attainment of age 65 or 70 with
diminished employment capacity, it is difficult to see how a state's forc-
ing its employees into retirement solely on the basis of chronological
age can satisfy the rational basis standard of equal protection review.159
THE DUE PRocEss CHALLENGE
Procedural Due Process - Government Employment as a
Constitutionally Protected Property Interest
The principle of due process is derived from the laws of England
where it was designed to stay the arbitrary hand of the Crown and
place the subject under the protection of law. 60 The fifth and four-
teenth amendments prohibit the government from depriving a person
of an interest in constitutionally protected liberty or property without
some kind of hearing prior to the termination of that interest. Never-
theless, this safeguard, known as procedural due process, encompasses
only a finite range of interests. The mere fact that one is employed by
the government is no guaranty that discharge must conform to pro-
cedural due process.
In Board of Regents v. Roth,61 plaintiff was hired for a period
of one year as an assistant professor of political science. Before the
midway point of the academic year, he was informed without expla-
nation that his contract would not be renewed. He then filed suit in
the District of Columbia. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1954, at 1, col. 8. See also Mollere v.
Southeastern La. College, 804 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La. 1969) (State College's attempt to offset
losses in housing revenue by requiring female students under age 21 to reside in campus
dormitories struck down. as arbitrary and irrational).
1;8 See Clark, Physical Problems in the Employment of Aging Men, 76 INT'L LAE. REV.
867 (1957) (approximately 20% of 70-year-old men are chronically disabled).
'69 See generally Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 682, 651 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring). In this case the use of the rational basis test was advocated to show that
mandatory pregnancy leaves after the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy violated equal
protection.
mhe objectionableportions of these regulations appear to be bottomed on
ctually unsupported assumptions about the ability of pregnant teachers to per-
form their jobs. The overwhelming weight of the medical testimony adduced in
these cases is that most teachers undergoing normal pregnancies are quite capable
of carrying out their responsibilities until some il-defined point a short period
prior to term .... Thus, it appears that by forcing all pregnant teachers under-
going a normal pregnancy from the dassroom so far in advance of term, the
regulations compel large numbers of able-bodied teachers to quit work.
Id. at 654-55 (footnote omitted).
160 See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 841 U.S. 123, 142-74 (1951)
(Black 8, Frankfurter, JJ., concurring).
161408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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the federal district court claiming that he was entitled to a statement
of the reasons for his discharge and a hearing on the merits. According
to plaintiff, his nonrenewal was in retaliation for his criticism of the
university administration.
The Supreme Court held that plaintiff, as a nontenured teacher
hired on a year-to-year basis, did not have a constitutionally cognizable
interest in reemployment. Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart
declared:
It stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived
of "liberty" when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains
as free as before to seek another.162
To invoke the safeguards of procedural due process, the person af-
fected must have more than a need or desire for the property at issue.
He must have a contract or implied promise 1 3 entitling him to con-
tinued employment. In Roth, the plaintiff's contract provided that his
employment terminated at the close of the academic year.
The plaintiff argued that his nonrenewal imposed a stigma upon
him that would create substantial adverse effects on his teaching career.
His intention was to come within the scope of a series of Supreme
Court decisions which have held that "[w]here a person's good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the govern-
ment is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are
essential."' 64 Nevertheless, the Court held that the fact that non-
retention might make him less attractive to prospective employers did
not constitute such a stigma.165
The government employee faced with mandatory retirement is
usually tenured, thereby coming within the ambit of the protection
afforded by procedural due process. On the other hand, the statutes
affecting his employment as a civil servant frequently provide for
mandatory retirement at a certain age, thereby negating any expectancy
of continued employment. For example, in Gault,16 the Illinois School
Code provided tenure for any teacher completing two consecutive pro-
bationary terms. A subsequent paragraph added that such tenure would
cease on the teacher's sixty-fifth birthday and that any further employ-
162 Id. at 575 (citation omitted).
163 See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
164 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). See Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 140-42 (1951).
165 408 U.S. at 574 n.13. See generally Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S.
232 (1957) (state refused to allow petitioner to take bar examination because of his
membership in the Communist Party 17 years earlier).
166 See notes 104-05 and accompanying text supra.
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ment must be on an annual basis, thereby making dismissal of the older
teacher as easy as that of the plaintiff in Roth. The Court's recent de-
cision in Arnett v. Kennedy,1 7 however, indicates that the legislature
may not readily dilute the strictures of procedural due process affecting
tenured civil servants.
In Arnett, a nonprobationary employee of the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO) was discharged for alleged defamatory statements
about other OEO employees. Under the procedures adopted by the
Civil Service Commission, the discharged employee had an immediate
opportunity to appear before the official vested with power to remove
in order to answer the charges made, but a full trial-type hearing was
deferred until after the discontinuance of employment.',, In dictum,
a three-judge plurality stated that the procedures adopted were valid
on the ground that the governmental employer, as a condition of em-
ployment, could limit the procedural safeguards relating to removal 69
The remaining six Justices sharply rejected this view; to them the issue
was whether the Commission's procedures satisfied the requirements of
procedural due process. Concurring in the result reached by the plu-
rality, Justice Powell found their approach to procedural due process
incompatible with the principles set forth in Roth in that it would
permit the deprivation of a protected property interest without notice
or an opportunity to be heard at any time. He continued:
This view misconceives the origin of the right to procedural due
process. That right is conferred not by legislative grace, but by con-
stitutional guarantee. . . . [The legislature] may not constitu-
tionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once con-
ferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards.170
It should be obvious that this reasoning should apply not only to
the termination of employment but also to the revocation of tenure.
If this were not so, an employee, once tenure has been revoked, could
be simply and expediently removed by the nonrenewal of his "annual"
contract. Of course tenure and employment may be conditioned upon
such factors as continued competent performance and avoidance of
167 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
168 See id. at 142-44 & nn.8-13.
169 Id. at 170.
170 Id. at 167. Justice Powell went on to find that the 30-day notice of intent to dis-
charge coupled with a right to answer the reviewing officer and obtain a trial-type hearing
on appeal satisfied the dictates of procedural due process. Id. at 170-71. Justice White, in
a separate opinion, agreed with this view. Id. at 185. Justices Marshall, Douglas, and
Brennan rejected not only the plurality's view that the legislature could fashion due
process statutorily, but also the concept that the evidentiary hearing could be held after
dismissal. Id. at 206-27.
1975]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
criminal activity. It is the very purpose of a due process hearing to
establish whether facts which merit termination exist. Yet, if age 65
or 70 is deemed a sufficient basis for termination regardless of the
individual's capacity, the sole purpose of such a hearing would be to
allow the worker to disprove his age. 171
Substantive Due Process - Constitutionality of Conclusive
Presumption of Incapacity
It appears unjust to allow the employee charged with having a
debilitating physical condition or being generally incompetent to rebut
these charges by showing his actual ability and at the same time deny
such opportunity to the unblemished worker who happens to reach 65
or 70. A series of recent Supreme Court decisions indicates that such
an anomaly violates evolving concepts of substantive due process.
Under these holdings, even though the employee lacks a specifically
protected interest under the first, fifth, or fourteenth amendments, the
government may not ignore his individual ability and dismiss him on
the basis of an irrebuttable presumption of incapacity when such
presumption is shown to lack general validity.172
In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,173 the Court held
unconstitutional the unpaid mandatory pregnancy leave regulations of
two school boards. These regulations had required the teacher to leave
work after either the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy. Since some
teachers become physically incapable during the latter stages of preg-
nancy, the school boards argued that the regulations were reasonable
measures to insure the welfare of mother and child as well as the
physical capabilities of teachers in the classroom.
The medical evidence presented by both sides undermined the
school board's position. The ability of any particular pregnant woman
to work past a fixed time in her pregnancy was very much an individual
matter."74 Lacking proof to sustain the general validity of the regu-
lations, the Court, using due process analysis, relied upon two grounds
to nullify them.
First, they exacted a needless penalty from the teacher who chose
171 In In re Wallington's Appeal, 390 Pa. 416, 135 A.2d 744 (1957), three city policemen
requested a hearing to challenge their forced retirement at age 65. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court found little use for a hearing, observing:
This is not a dismissal, based upon misconduct, incompetence, or political affilia-
tion, but retirement based upon age limitation. The only useful purpose a
hearing could serve, would be a denial of their age.
Id. at 418, 135 A.2d at 745.
172 See generally Substantive Due Process, supra note 93, at 1647-53.
'73 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
174 Id. at 645-46.
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to bear a child. In so doing, the rules constituted a governmental in-
trusion into matters of marriage and family life which are afforded
stringent protection under the due process clause.175 Second, and on
the issue of mandatory retirement more significant, the rules amounted
to a conclusive presumption of physical incapacity applicable in the
face of medical evidence demonstrating the individual's continued
capacity. In words that are strikingly applicable to the mandatory
retirement situation, Justice Stewart wrote:
Even assuming, arguendo, that there are some women who would
be physically unable to work past the particular cut off dates em-
bodied in the challenged rules, it is evident that there are large
numbers of teachers who are fully capable of continuing work for
longer than the Cleveland and Chesterfield County regulations will
allow. Thus, the conclusive presumption embodied in these rules
... is neither "necessarily [nor] universally true," and is violative
of the Due Process Clause.176
An argument might be made that the conclusive presumptions
challenged in LaFleur were constitutionally offensive only because
they impinged on a fundamental right, namely, the right to bear
children. The argument would continue, therefore, that conclusive
presumptions impinging on tenured employment would not be consti-
tutionally offensive since no fundamental right is involved. Such a
restrictive interpretation draws apparent support from the Court's
conclusion: "[W]e hold that the mandatory termination provisions...
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because
of their use of unwarranted conclusive presumptions that seriously
burden the exercise of protected constitutional liberty."'177
Closer analysis, however, reveals that this interpretation is without
merit. The LaFleur Court used the words "protected constitutional
liberty." As was seen in Roth, tenured employment, although admit-
tedly not a recognized fundamental right, is nevertheless a constitu-
tionally protected property interest under the due process clause. 78
175 Id. at 639-40. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
176 414 U.S. at 645-46. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in LaFleur, recognized the
potential impact of the Court's decision on the area of compulsory retirement regulations:
"[T]he Court will have to strain valiantly in order to avoid having today's opinion lead
to the invalidation of mandatory retirement statutes for governmental employees." Id.
at 659.
177 Id. at 651.
178 In Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973), a college president, fired without a hearing on the
basis of allegedly circulating a confidential memorandum proposing that the college's
ethnic study program be changed, was held to have been deprived of a property interest
without due process of law. The court noted that since his contractual term had not
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An even more powerful rebuttal is the Court's holding in Vlandis
v. Kline.'. 9 In Vlandis, the petitioners challenged a state statute which
regulated the tuition rates at the state university where nonresidents
were required to pay higher tuition than state residents. The peti-
tioners attacked as unconstitutional the provision that if the student
was married and a nonresident at the time of his application, he was
conclusively presumed to be a nonresident during his entire career at
the university and thus denied the opportunity to demonstrate that he
had become a bona fide resident. The Court agreed with the petitioners.
Writing once again for the Court, Justice Stewart reasoned that:
[I]t is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual
the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable
presumption of nonresidence, when that presumption is not neces-
sarily or universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable
alternative means of making the crucial determination. Rather,
standards of due process require that the State allow such an indi-
vidual the opportunity to present evidence showing that he is a
bona fide resident entitled to the in-state rates.1 0
Neither the in-state tuition rates nor the obtaining of a higher educa-
tion constituted a fundamental interest, nevertheless the Court held
that the government could not withhold the lower rates on the basis
of conclusive presumptions of inability to meet the required standards.
The Fifth Circuit, in Thompson v. Gallagher,181 anticipated the
Court's reasoning in LaFleur when it struck down under the due
process clause a city ordinance possessing many of the characteristics
of a mandatory retirement statute. Plaintiff Thompson was the cus-
todian at the city diesel plant. Five weeks after he had commenced
work at the plant, the city council passed a resolution requiring that
all city employees who were veterans possess an honorable discharge.
expired, the term established by contract constituted a property interest which the state
could not extinguish without affording him a hearing in which he would be informed
of the reasons for his nonretention and be able to challenge their sufficiency. 471 F.2d
at 494.
It can be argued that older workers subject to mandatory retirement have no
expectation of continued employment past the specified age. However, as LaFleur and
Arnett indicate, the state can neither act arbitrarily by statute or contract nor circumvent
constitutional mandates through artful draftsmanship. See also Thompson v. Gallagher,
489 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973), discussed in text accompanying notes 181-87 infra.
179 412 U.S. 441 (1973), cited in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644
(1974).
180 412 U.S. at 452. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (irrebuttable pre-
sumption that all unwed fathers were unfit to raise their children); Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89 (1965) (irrebuttable presumption that all servicemen stationed in Texas, not
Texas residents prior to induction, were nonresidents for local voting purposes as long
as they remained in the military).
181489 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973).
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The day after the resolution was passed Thompson was fired. He had
left the Army with an undesirable discharge. Although such a discharge
is not honorable, it is not dishonorable and can be issued for security
considerations and causes such as homosexuality, financial irresponsi-
bility, and bed-wetting.182
According to Thompson, many of the reasons for which a less than
honorable discharge could be received bore no rational relation to the
responsibilities of a plant custodian. Therefore, he argued that his
summary termination was a taking in violation of his right to due
process. The city countered that it had a strong interest in maintaining
the quality of its work force and a less than honorable discharge sig-
nified, if not criminal behavior, at least antisocial characteristics. 8 3
In an unreported decision, the district court "wholeheartedly" agreed
with the defendant's contentions and entered judgment for the city.1 84
Thompson appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The court of appeals felt the issue before it to be whether, in the
absence of a specifically defined constitutional right, due process of
law protects the governmental employee from arbitrary dismissal.185 In
holding that it did, the court, through Judge Morgan, stated:
Just as a public employee does not give up his First Amendment
rights when he begins receiving a pay check from the government,
neither does he give up his right to due process of law. The Four-
teenth Amendment stands for the proposition that the government
must act, when it acts, in a manner which is neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable. 8 6
Having decided that the city's sweeping dismissal of all veterans
with less than honorable discharges must be rationally justifiable, the
court turned its attention to the justifications proffered by the city.
Although maintaining the quality of the work force was a legitimate
governmental interest, the court agreed with Thompson's contention
that numerous factors leading to a less than honorable discharge bore
no relationship to one's ability to function as a plant custodian. In a
182 Id. at 448-49.
183 Id. at 448.
184 See id.
185 Id. at 447. The court politely distinguished, as not coming to grips with the issues
in the instant case, Judge (later Justice) Holmes' rejection of a policeman's assertion that
he had been dismissed for exercising his first amendment rights. Judge Holmes wrote: "The
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman." Id. at 446, quoting McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155
Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
186 489 F.2d at 447.
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statement well suited for workers forcibly retired on the basis of
chronological age, the court declared:
[A] general category of "persons with other than honorable dis-
charges" is too broad to be called "reasonable" when it leads to
automatic dismissal from any form of municipal employment. We
have no hesitancy in calling the ordinance which bars that class
of persons from city employment, without any consideration of
the merits of each individual case, irrational. 87
Due Process Infirmities
The due process implications of Roth, Arnett, LaFleur, Vlandis,
and Thompson suggest that mandatory retirement statutes, as presently
constituted, are constitutionally defective. 88 Nothing in these cases,
however, prevents a government from employing effective tests of job
performance and expeditious termination hearings which meet the re-
quirements of substantive and procedural due process. But since medi-
cal evidence establishes that decrements in work capacity are not in the
exclusive domain of any particular age group, it should be recognized
that setting up rigorous tests for only those over the former compulsory
retirement age might violate equal protection.
187Id. at 449. Accord, Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., Civil No. 72-5307
(S.D.N.Y., Aug. 6, 1975) (blanket refusal to employ former heroin addicts enrolled in
methadone maintenance programs violates equal protection and due process clauses).
The Thompson court also found the statute to discriminate irrationally against
veterans since there was no city ordinance limiting employment to only those individuals
who were, for example, good security risks or nonhomosexuals. 489 F.2d at 449. The court
noted that not all the grounds for which one might receive a less than honorable dis-
charge were necessarily impermissible as causes for dismissal. But to be constitutionally
valid, the court cautioned that the ordinance should enumerate the characteristics deemed
conducive to competent performance making them part of a comprehensive plan excluding
all those lacking the specified characteristics. Id.
188 Although LaFleur did cause the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to
reverse a dismissal of a challenge to the mandatory retirement of federal employees at age
70, Weisbrod v. Lynn, 494 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam), the Supreme Court's dis-
missal of the appeal in Mclvaine v. State Police, 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973), appeal
dismissed, 415 U.S. 986 (1974), discussed in notes 8-19 and accompanying text supra, has
led the district court in Weisbrod once again to dismiss the case. 383 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C.
1974) (mem.) (three-judge court), af'd mem., 420 U.S. 940 (1975). The district court rea-
soned that the Supreme Court could not have been unaware of the implications of LaFleur,
and since the dismissal for want of a substantial federal question is binding on the merits,
the district court was obligated to dismiss unless the two cases were not analogous. Since
both cases involved mandatorily retired employees who claimed they were fully competent,
the court held that the Mclivaine precedent was binding. 383 F. Supp. at 937. See note 10
supra. The precedential value of such dismissals is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 20-32 supra. Whether other courts will follow the example of the district court in
Weisbrod remains to be seen. At the time of this writing, Gault v. Garrison, Civil No.
74-C-931 (N.D. Ill., May 22, 1974) (mem.) (statute requiring retirement of teacher at age
65 upheld), is on appeal to the Seventh Circuit. See id., appeal docketed, No. 74-1579, 7th
Cir., June 20, 1974.
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CONCLUSION
Since the early twentieth century, the older worker has been in-
creasingly viewed as the least efficient member of the work force.
Industry's attitude toward the aged employee finds its counterpart in
society's generally negative stereotyping of the elderly. The courts too
have succumbed to the popular perspective on aging. The defect in
the perspective is that it views aging as a degenerative process, elevating
the physical advantages of youth over the experiential advantages of
age.
There will indeed be a social cost factor if mandatory retirement
statutes are overturned. Yet, the dimensions of this cost defy quanti-
fication. The data examined in this Note indicate that a large-scale
social disruption will not follow the replacement of mandatory retire-
ment with another program. 189 In actuality, there are strong reasons to
encourage the older worker to remain in the work force. With the
number of the aged increasing, a corresponding increase in the tax bur-
den will be felt by younger workers as social security costs rise.190
The materials discussed in this Note reveal that the overwhelming
concern for the aged is focused upon their level of social security or
retirement benefits. These older and often able employees have been
denied by tie courts an opportunity to demonstrate their individual
abilities even though pregnant teachers, women, 191 less than honorably
discharged veterans, and former heroin addicts 92 may not constitu-
tionally be denied this opportunity. It would appear that the availa-
bility of certain retirement benefits to the older governmental employee
no more justifies his mandatory expulsion from the labor force than
did the availability of welfare, unemployment, or similar "benefits" to
the above-mentioned classes of individuals. In sum, it is submitted that
the obligatory retirement of older workers simply does not withstand
rational analysis.
John B. McHugh
189 See notes 153-55 and accompanying text supra. It may be argued, however, that
the rationale which would bring about the fall of age-based retirement would likewise
presage the end of age minimums on voting and obtaining drivers' licenses. See Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (Congress cannot reduce the voting age in local and state
elections from 21 to 18). Yet such results are far from being automatic since the issues
involved in other age-based statutes are inherently distinct from those involved in other
mandatory retirement and hence must be deided on their individual merits.
190 See Dale, Social Security Healthy but Facing Problems, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1975,
at 27, col. 1, at 39, cols. 6-7.
191Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969), discussed in
note 105 supra.
192 See Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., Civil No. 72-5307 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 6,
1975).
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